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The Battle of Pea Ridge 6-8 March 1862

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR



BY CPT Larry W. Curtis

The Battle of Pea Ridge was the most important Civil War Battle fought west of the Mississippi River. The Union Army of the Southwest effectively defeated the Confederate Army of the West at Pea Ridge. This defeat ensured that Arkansas and Missouri would remain in the hands of the Union. If the Union Army had been defeated at Pea Ridge there would have been no forces available to stop the Confederate Army from seizing Arkansas, Missouri,

and the key Midwestern city of St. Louis.

In Arkansas and Missouri the governors and legislatures were avowed secessionists. Arkansas and Missouri were both torn with internal fighting, feuds, and guerilla warfare. Both the Union and the Confederacy made Missouri a high military and political priority. Both sides knew that by controlling Missouri, they could control navigation on the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers.

Both the Missouri and the Mississippi Rivers were key routes for transportation and communication. Morale was not exceptionally high for the Union or the Confederate Army. The Union Army had suffered defeat at Wilson's Creek, Missouri. There was much bickering among the leadership in both armies. On the Confederate side especially, the Arkansas and Missouri State Militia could not agree with the regular Confederate Forces as to who should





Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis


be their overall commander. The Union Army of the Southwest was led by Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis. General Curtis had graduated from West Point in 1831. After a year's service in the army, he resigned his commission to work as a civil engineer and lawyer. In 1856 he was elected to his first of three terms as a United States congressman from the state of Iowa. When the war broke out, he resigned his congressional seat and took command of the 2nd Iowa Infantry. In May, 1861 he was appointed to command the Southwest District of Missouri. General Curtis quickly assumed command. With logic and precision he laid out the details of the logistics for his campaign throughout

Missouri and Arkansas. He was an excellent logistician, administrator, and a very methodical planner. It was said that, "no soldier in Curtis' army would find himself wanting so much as a pinch of salt." His logistical and administrative abilities proved to be a decisive factor at Pea Ridge. The Confederate Forces were led by Major General Van Dorn (see next

commander of the Confederate Mississippi District. Van Dorn proved to be acceptable as the overall commander of the diverse Confederate forces. However, in his haste to leave Little Rock, Arkansas, he departed toward northwest Arkansas and Missouri with but a single staff officer. He fought at Pea Ridge with a hastily improvised and disastrously inadequate staff. This neglect for detail and lack of adequate staff work was a significant factor in the Confederates' failure at Pea Ridge.

General Van Dorn led a force of approximately 17,000 men to Pea Ridge. His plan was simply to smash Curtis' army as

On 16 January 1862 General Van Dorn was appointed




Battle of Pea Ridge

Van Dorn's Flank March

**Night of March 6-7,
With Opening Clashes
on the Morning of
March 7**

Little Sugar Ck.



Major General Earl Van Dorn

quickly as possible and then continue his march to the north until he seized Missouri and the key river port city of St. Louis. General Van Dorn had some difficult command and control problems. His forces consisted of three distinct units: the Missouri State Guard, the Confederate Provisional Army, and the Cherokee Indians. The Missouri State Guard was poorly disciplined and badly armed and equipped.

Pea Ridge is located in the northwest corner of the state of Arkansas (see map 1). The terrain is very thickly wooded, hilly, and criss-crossed by steep ravines. Movement of artillery was very difficult for both armies, except along the roads and open fields. On 5 March 1862, a blinding snow


storm fell on the Union soldiers as they advanced toward Pea Ridge. Immediately upon arrival at Little Sugar Creek the men took positions behind rocks and trees. The bluffs along Little Sugar Creek held a commanding view of Telegraph Road and the surrounding valley. General Curtis had his forces dig in along the bluffs on the north bank of Little Sugar

nue of approach.

General Curtis made extensive use of obstacles. Parties were detailed to fell timber to obstruct roads and other key avenues of approach. Field works were also erected to increase the strength of the fighting positions. General Curtis strategically placed his artillery batteries to cover the erected obstacles and the main avenues of approach. One battery covering a key avenue of approach was completely shielded by extensive earth work erected by a Pioneer Company.

The battle began on the afternoon of 6 March 1862. The weather was cold and blustering. During the battle visibility was good, there was

Creek (see map 2). He believed the Confederate forces would attack from the south, using Telegraph Road as their primary ave-





no precipitation, the temperature remained cold, and the winds were negligible. The Union forces consisted of about 12,000 men. However, only about 10,500 men were present for the battle. The other 1,500 men were very busily engaged supporting General Curtis' fragile, vulnerable supply lines running southwest from Rolla and Springfield, Missouri (see map 1).

General Van Dorn was informed by his cavalry reconnaissance of General Curtis' position. A minor skirmish took place on the afternoon of 6 March. Realizing that General Curtis held a firm position, General Van Dorn decided to feint at Little Sugar Creek and then flank Curtis by using the Bentonville Detour Road (see map 2). Van Dorn prepared to attack Curtis from the rear on the morning of 7 March 1862. General Curtis, having obtained information from local spies, was made aware of General Van Dorn's move. During the early morning hours of 7 March he completely reversed his front (see map 2), having all his units do an about face and prepare for an attack coming from Pea Ridge. The men hastily moved and sought whatever protection they could find using existing split rail fences and other natural barriers.

On the morning of 7 March

Battle of Elkhorn Tavern March 7, 1862



Fighting on March 8

General Van Dorn attacked. For some unknown reason he chose to leave the majority of his supply train at Elm Springs, Arkansas. Elm Springs is located about twenty miles south of Pea Ridge. This proved to be a fatal error. The battle raged furiously throughout the day. The Confederates pushed the Union forces back at Leetown (see map 3) and Elkhorn Tavern (see map 4). By the evening of the 7th the Confederates had gained about a half mile of ground that had been held by the Union.

During the early morning hours of 8 March, General Curtis reorganized his forces and prepared to counterattack at daylight. His counterattack was successful. General Van Dorn was forced to retreat, due to a lack of ammunition and supplies (see map 5). Some of his men had not eaten for two days. His failure to locate his supplies close to his battle position was a primary factor in his defeat. Confederate losses totaled 800 men. Union losses totaled 1,384 men.

After the Battle of Pea Ridge, General Curtis continued his march southward and secured the state of Arkansas for the Union. General Van Dorn retreated east of the Mississippi River and was ordered to reinforce campaigns in the Mississippi and Tennessee area.

The Battle of Pea Ridge was one of the most important victories for the Union in the Mississippi area, since it effectively secured the states of Arkansas and Missouri for the Union.

The essence of the battle is summed up in a quote from Brigadier General Franz Sigel, Commander, First Division, Army of the Southwest, Union Army:

"It was not a great battle, like that of Gettysburg or Chattanooga; it was not of such prepondering national importance; it did not break the backbone of the Rebellion, but it virtually cleared the South-west of the enemy, gave peace to the people of Missouri, at least for the next two years, and made it possible for our veterans to reinforce the armies under Buell, Rosecrans, Grant, and Sherman."



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST.

Pea Ridge, Ark., March 11, 1862.

SIR: I have finished burying the dead and made the best provisions I can for the wounded. Two divisions have advanced 6 miles, and my cavalry has scoured the country this side Fayetteville. The enemy has retreated, as before, beyond the Boston Mountains. I send forward prisoners, some 500.

In reference to a verbal communication from General Van Dorn, I have expressed a willingness to exchange prisoners of equivalent rank, and hope in this way to obtain some officers that I very much desire. It is warm, delightful weather, and roads are excellent. I move my headquarters near to Bentonville, to get away from the stench and desolation of the battle ground, and the better to overlook the approaches to the Boston Mountains. A scout informs me that forces were to advance from Fort Scott five or six days ago, but that Hunter and Lane were both absent. What is the matter out there?

Respectfully,

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Recollections of the 936th Field Artillery

By: *Arthur Stamm*


After basic and leaders course at Fort (then Camp) Chaffee, I was ordered to Fort Lewis for transfer to FECOM. We, I and 3500 other replacements, left Seattle aboard the MSTS Marine Lynx on 14 March 1953. Aboard were replacements for the Canadian "Princess Pat" Regiment. We dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay on 29 March 1953, arrived at Camp Drake near Yokohama on 30 March and returned to the ship on 31 March after processing and my assignment to the 936th.

I arrived at Inchon on 4 April, spent a couple of days in a replacement depot at Yongdungpo, and arrived at the railhead at Yonchon 7 April. I was part of five replacements, products of the Chaffee leadership school - 85th Recon., which were picked up there by a Charlie Battery vehicle. I was assigned to the fifth gun section of Charlie Battery. The Main Line of Resistance (MLR) was approximately two miles in front of our Battery. A Republic of Korea (ROK) 105mm Battery was emplaced behind us - the theory was for the medium artillery (155mm) to be

closer to the front to achieve greater interdiction range. I was told the battery had been in that same position, 35 miles east and a little north of Panmunjon, for the past 14 months.

We lived in squad tents surrounded by sandbagged walls. Nearby

U. S. divisional artillery lived in bunkers. Our fires were usually one to five round battery missions, but single gun or platoon gun missions were not uncommon. On 7 May our gun, Number 5, fired a six hour, 44 round single gun mission trying to hit a Chinese gun dug into a tunnel from the reverse



slope. Our target was literally a small hole in the forward slope from which the enemy gun tube protruded when it fired.


Observation for our Battalion was from Dagmar, Hill 355, which the 1st Commonwealth now occupied. Volunteers were regularly recruited to rebuild the forward observation (F.O.) bunker at Hill 355 and were offered four points as an inducement to volunteer. We were in a three point (support) zone, while troops on the MLR were in a four point zone. At the time it took 36 points to rotate, accumulated on a two, three, or a four point basis per month.

Shortly before I arrived, the three versus two point (rear) zone border was revised and our service battery, finding itself zoned out of three points, immediately moved to get back into a three point zone.

Much of our fire was directed by air - the most accurate method. Often we could see the L-19s, similar to a Piper Cub, cruising back and forth parallel to the MLR with Chinese anti-aircraft fire bursting around them. For proper spotting it was necessary to fly a straight line perpendicular to the target making the observing aircraft's route predict-

able. But I never saw one shot down.

We fired mostly night missions. These fires were for harassment and interdiction - H&Is. The theory was to keep the enemy awake and hopefully strike a road crossing just as it was being used. Chinese movement was virtually restricted to the hours of darkness due to our air domination. But the missions were almost always "on the Hour", as opposed to random times. It would have taken an unimaginably dull enemy commander not to have figured out the pattern and avoid it! They were neither dull nor unimaginable.




"C" Battery Operations Area

7 APR 1953-26 JUL 1953

as
 Sketched by the author:
 ARTHUR STAMM



The author practicing field sanitation while supporting the "Brits" on the Hook.



View of the frontlines from the searchlight- looking North- Injim on the right. Chinese held Little Nori in the background.

Only when the Chinese attacked did we fire extensively. These attacks would usually take place in the rain since rain diminished the effectiveness of our variable time - radio proximity (VT) fuse, which was the fuse of choice for air bursts against attacking infantry. Rain clouds simulate a solid object to the fuse and cause the shell to detonate in the air long before it arrived on target. The projectile was supposedly "bore-safe" in that it took the rotation of "going-up-the-tube" to arm it a few seconds after it left the gun. I have seen four of six rounds from a battery mission during the rain explode a few hundred yards in the air in front of our guns. Just before the war ended, we received new VT fuses supposedly less sensitive to rain.

often ignored these orders, resulting in "iron pot" time, steel helmets, and holes in our tents!

We became so dependent on the ease of VT fusing that a minor flap occurred one night when we were ordered to use time fuses and no one knew how to set them. There was a lot of reading of technical manuals


The Korean 105 battery behind us was under orders not to fire VT under rain conditions as their shells became armed over our heads. Unfortunately, in their zeal to support their comrades, the 1st ROK, they

the next day.

The war in Korea at this time, and for the last 18 months, was positional warfare. It was an artillery war. We fired more artillery rounds in Korea than in all of World War II. The Western Front (our battalion was located due North of Seoul) was anchored on Panmunjon. The Marines held east of there, then the 1st Commonwealth, 1st ROK (the Capitol Division) and U. S. 7th Division.

On 25 May, Charlie Battery pulled out of position and moved to "The Hook" to support the 1st Commonwealth repel an expected Chinese offensive. The word we received was it would come on a certain night (Thursday?) between

Gun and prime mover hooked up-almost ready to C.S.M.O. (Close station-march order).





Spring of 1953 - Bunker in Charlie Battery Position

eight and ten P. M. I have since learned such precise intelligence was not unusual. Chinese military doctrine prescribed specific knowledge of plans down to the squad level with the result that line crossers, i.e.

deserters, told all - literally! For the first and only time we were firing 19 and 17 round battery missions - unheard of for 155's. And it was raining!

We usually were chewed out for firing too fast as this was deemed to cause excessive wear on the gun tube and also result in inaccurate laying of the gun on the aiming stakes. But

not that night! A good crew on a 155 could put out five to six rounds a minute but I am sure we exceeded that. The main concern of our Chief of Section was that we swab between each round to avoid a powder bag detonation from burning

residue before the breech was closed.


It was then an outpost war. In late June 1953 the Chinese attacked Queen, Bak and Betty which we supported. During these assaults on the 1st ROK, which was the largest shoot from our "permanent" position, there was a steady stream of

traffic to the rear on the Military Service Road (MSR) next to our position. But the ROKs held although they lost outposts Queen, Bak and Betty. Fuses became in such short supply our battery vehicles were driving to Inchon to get them directly off the ships.

In July the Chinese again attacked Pork Chop Hill. We held it in April as depicted in the movie but let them have it this time. Our battery pulled out of position and supported the 7th in this battle. All of these attacks, and especially the big Chinese summer offensive on the Central Front, where a sister 155 battalion, the 552nd, was overrun, were related to the on-going "peace" talks at Panmunjon.



Charlie Battery's position from the guard tent in the valley.



Number 5 Gun at Maximum Elevation. Chief of Section and two "KATUSAs" in the 5th Section

During one all night shoot, within twenty minutes of each other, two guns (#6 and #2) fired without first ramming a projectile in the tube. This was credited to the crew's fatigue. When they fired, burning powder was projected over the entire hill in front of us. On 13 May a round exploded in the tube of #4 gun in Able Battery. This phenomena is theoretically impossible, i.e. bore-safe. Miraculously, no one was hurt.

Though we enjoyed air superiority, the Chinese did send over "Bed Check Charlies" at night. These were slow flying bi-planes which would tootle down the valleys below radar cover and drop a few bombs to keep the troops awake. Many an outdoor movie was scratched because of a Red Air Alert. They did however achieve one outstanding success by blowing up a POL dump near Inchon. We could see the flames from up on the line. A shortage of heating oil for our stoves was the result.

Apparently jets were ineffective in shooting down these planes - too fast? The Air Force brought over some WWII prop driven Corsairs. While I was there, the first ace was made for shooting down five of these "Bed Check Charlies".

KATUSAs (Korean Augmentations to the United States Army) had long been used to flesh out our units. In April our Battery received about two dozen of these Korean Army soldiers. After de-lousing and receiving new clothing, three were assigned to my gun section, Moon Young Moh, Son Num Ju and Ahn. Despite language problems, they were a real help and I became good friends with Moon.

The peace talks finally produced a truce at 9:45 P. M. on 27 July 1953. The next day we moved out to a temporary position near Whitefront Bridge which was just west of the Ingim. Our main reserve position was the old Kansas Line south of the 38th Parallel, which we spent the next month improving.

A "permanent" camp was set up south of there, Camp Saint Barbara, "the patron saint of artillery". This held I Corp's artillery including HQ Battery, 1st F. A. Observation BN, and the 17th, 96th, 623rd, and the 936th F. A. BNs, also, the Artillery School "little Old Fort Sill" and "Nomad" (Armed Forces Radio).

The firing batteries of the 936th would rotate to spend one month in our forward position a few hundred yards west of the Whitefront Bridge. The idea was to

give our infantry some immediate support in case the Chinese attacked through the DMZ.

The infantry now occupied our old battery position. Once the moves were accomplished and things settled down, a lot of time was spent on sudden alerts and scrambles. Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (RSOP's) were conducted to different firing positions with live round exercises that simulated a breaking of the truce and a Chinese attack. Eventually, the battery became adept at this, but the three or four months following the truce were worrisome in terms of combat readiness. In large measure this was due to inexperienced replacements and lack of combat training.

Even more worrisome in the Spring of 1954 were the "wet weather" indoctrination courses at a time when the French were losing the Indo Chinese war at Dien Bien Phu. It was obvious that serious military intervention by the U. S. was being considered. However, this did not then take place, with results we are now all familiar with.

I rotated home out of the battery on 9 June 1954.

ISSUE SIDEARMS OF THE U.S. ARMY OF

WORLD WAR I

BY SGT. MICHAEL JEU

The United States Army has the reputation of issuing the finest and most modern firearms available to their troops. This has been demonstrated historically by the issuing of such

renowned battle rifles as the 1903 Springfield rifle, the M-1 Garand, the M-14, and presently the M-16 rifle. These rifles all have been battle proven and have played a vital role in our Army's history. Every soldier can vividly remember


the rifle that served with them.

The tradition of issuing the best rifle available to the soldier also carried over to the issue sidearm of the soldier. True to form, the United States Army issued the best sidearm available to their troops. We will look at the issue service sidearms of World War I. One must remember that whether it be the service rifle or issue sidearm, con-


troversy abounded and it is still evident today.

In approximately 1892 the Army decided to go to a .38 caliber handgun for issue to the troops. This was a decision that was submerged in controversy. There were repeated stories of the failures of the .38 caliber on the battlefields. During the earlier Philippine campaigns our troops used a .38 caliber pistol. Our soldiers observed that when the tough tribesmen were hit with these bullets and even seriously wounded they frequently kept on fighting for some time. What was needed was a hand weapon that would put the adversary out of the fight the instant he was hit, whether fatally or not. It is important to note that by the early 1900's the Army was calling out of retirement the .45 Colt caliber single action revolvers and reissuing them to the troops in the field. As a stopgap measure in 1909, the .45 Colt caliber was once again adopted as the standard issue by the Army. The newly adopted sidearm was the Colt double action New Service Model, or design-

Colt New Army and Navy Revolver



New Army and Navy Revolver, Models of 1892, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1901, and 1903.



Colt New Service Double Action Revolver

Model 1917 U.S. Army; within serials 150000 - 301000

nated as the Model of 1909. This was a six shot double action revolver, blued finish, five and one half inch barrel, wooden grip panels, and a lanyard ring. This revolver represented the state of the art in handguns at the time of its adoption. The Model 1909 fired a cartridge composed of a 255 grain lead bullet backed by 84 grains of RSQ smokeless powder and the casing had a slightly wider rim to facilitate extraction. The reason that the Model 1909 revolver and its .45 Colt caliber was considered a stopgap was the Army had already decided to go to a semiautomatic pistol for issue. The Army just needed something to tide them over until the new type of handgun was perfected. That came two years later with Colt's Model of 1911 that fired a rimless .45 acp (automatic colt pistol) caliver. The .45 acp was not quite as powerful as the old .45 Colt loadings because it fired a 230 grain bullet at a nominal 830 feet per second. Still, it has proven itself in numerous wars and conflicts.


As America continued on course with the ominous clouds of War in Europe, the need for the newly adopted pistol to be perfected was imperative. one of America's inventive geniuses, John Browning, answered the call, by perfecting his design of the Colt Model 1911.

There are volumes of information on this particular handgun and it has served the Army admirably during its reign from 1911 until 1985.

The Colt Model 1911 was of the semiautomatic design, blued finish, fixed sights, magazine capacity of seven cartridges, wooden grip panels, and lanyard ring. The Colt .45 acp fired a 230 grain jacketed bullet at a nominal 830 feet per second. This combination gave the bullet the impact of a sledge hammer, and a man hit went down every time.

dier with average training could hit what he was shooting at with the Colt. The big improvement in the automatic features brought it to a stage where it could be fired by a practiced man 21 times in 12 seconds. In this type of operation, the recoil of each discharge ejects the empty cartridge and loads in a fresh cartridge.

At the time that America entered World War I only a few men of each Infantry regiment carried pistols when our troops first entered the trenches. As history would have it, in almost



SMITH & WESSON DOUBLE ACTION REVOLVER, CALIBER .45, MODEL 1917.

Moreover, the greatest improvement had been made in the accuracy of the weapon, the 1911 Colt was the straightest shooting pistol ever produced in this country. Until then, even the best of the older semi-automatics and revolvers were accurate only in the hands of the expert. It was found that any average sol-

the first skirmish this weapon proved its superior usefulness in trench fighting. Such incidents as that of the single American soldier who dispersed or killed a whole squad of German Bayoneteers which had surrounded him struck the enemy with fear of Yankee prowess with the pistol.

The Army made a decision by midsummer of 1917 to supply the infantry a much more extensive equipment of automatic pistols than had been prescribed by regulations, to build them by the hundreds of thousands where we had been turning them out by the thousands. In February of 1917, with war in sight, realizing the limitations of our capacity then for producing pistols, the Colt automatic being manufactured exclusively by the Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company at Hartford, Conn., and for a limited period by the Springfield Armory, the Army took up with the Colt Company the proposition of securing drawings and other engineering data which would enable us to extend the production of this weapon to other plants. This work was in progress when in April of 1917, it was interrupted by the military necessity for the production of rifles.

In order to supplement the pistol supply, although the Colt automatic was the only weapon of this sort approved for the Army, the Secretary of War authorized the Chief of Ordnance to secure other small arms, particularly the double action .45 caliber revolver as manufactured by both the Colt company and the Smith & Wesson company. These revolvers had been designed to

use the standard Army caliber .45 acp pistol cartridges. The revolver was no so effective a weapon as the automatic pistol, but it was adopted in the emergency only to make it possible to provide sufficient numbers of these arms for the troops at the outset.

At the beginning of hostilities the Colt Company indicated that it could tool up to produce pistols at the rate of 6,000 per month by December 1917, and could also furnish 600 revolvers a week beginning in April. As soon as funds were made available, a contract was made with the Colt company for 500,000 pistols and 100,000 revolvers and to the Smith & Wesson company for 100,000 revolvers.

In December of 1917, the Remington Arms - Union Metallic Cartridge Company was instructed to prepare for the manufacture of 150,000, Colt Model 1911s, at a rate to reach a maximum production of 3,000 per day. There arose a problem in that the drawings and designs in the hands of the Colt company did not reflect the mechanical problems that had been discovered and modified. The drawings were completely redrawn and covered all the details and gave interchangeability between the parts of pistols produced by the Remington company and those of the Colt com-

pany, which was the goal sought.

During the summer of 1918 the demands for the Colt 1911 pistol was enormous. In order to fill these request contracts were given to the National Cash Register Company, the North American Arms Company in Canada, Savage Arms Company, Caron Brothers in Canada, Burroughs Adding Machine Company, Winchester Repeating Arms Company, Lanston Monotype Company, and Savage Munitions Company. All these companies produced the Colt Model 1911 in order to fill the demands from the American Expeditionary Forces. All these companies were proceeding energetically with preparations to manufacture when the Armistice came to cancel their contracts. No pistols were ever obtained from any except the Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company and the Remington Arms - Union Metallic Cartridge Company.

During the war, difficulty was experienced in securing machinery to check the walnut grip panels for the pistols, and to avoid delay in production, the Ordnance Department authorized the use of bakelite for pistol grips in all the new plants which were to manufacture the gun. Bakelite served as

a replacement substitute for hard rubber or amber.

At the outbreak of the war the Army owned approximately 75,000 .45 caliber semiautomatic pistols. At the signing of the Armistice there had been produced and accepted since April 6, 1917, a total of 643,755 pistols and revolvers. The production on the pistols totaled 375,404 and on the revolvers 268,351. In the four months prior to November 11, 1918, the average daily production of the automatic pistols was 1,993 and of revolvers 1,233. This was at the yearly production rate of approximately 600,000 pistols and 370,000 revolvers. The average cost for these pistols were approximately \$15.00 each.

The Colt Model 1911 .45 acp caliber pistol is legendary in its performance on the battlefield and is firmly planted in America's military history. Even though replaced by another semiautomatic pistol in 1985, the venerable Colt can still be found in the hands of America's fighting forces.

While the Colt Model 1911 .45 acp pistol overshadowed all other handguns in World War I, there are two revolvers that played an important role. These two revolvers were designated and authorized to sup-

plement the production of the Colt, they were the Colt and Smith & Wesson Model 1917 .45 acp revolvers.

Both revolvers were of the large frame design, double action, six shot, blued finish, fixed sights, five and a half inch barrel, wooden grip panels, and lanyard ring. Both fired the standard .45 acp cartridge.

In order to chamber the rim-

each clip held three cartridges, they also aided in speedy reloading.

Both of these revolvers were proven in battle and demonstrated the accuracy and reliability needed by our troops, while at the same time, filling an important gap for the Colt Model 1911.

Issue service handguns have changed somewhat over the years and con-



AUTOMATIC PISTOL, CALIBER .45, MODEL 1911.

less .45 acp cartridge a device had to be employed to hold the cartridges in order for them to be extracted once they were fired. These clever devices were commonly referred to as "half moon clips" since each device held three cartridges. The "half moon clip" was a thin piece of spring steel that snapped into the cartridge's extractor groove to give the gun's star extractor something to push against. Since

trovsky still surrounds their existence. Both the revolver and the semiautomatic pistol still survive and are being used by our troops throughout the world. While the Colt Model 1911, Colt Models 1909 & 1917, and the Smith & Wesson Model 1917 have taken their places in history, the issue sidearm will always play an important role with our troops wherever they may deploy.

Arkansas' Big Guns in the Gulf


From the Official After Action Report Records

At 151415 November 1990 the alert notice was received that the 142d Field Artillery Brigade, comprised of HHB, 1-142d FA, and 2-142d FA, would be federally mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield. On the same day COL Charles L. Lynch assumed command of the brigade. Six days later on the 21st of November the brigade received the federal mobilization order. There were 1140 personnel assigned to the brigade upon notification. Activities at home station included an initial POM (preparation for overseas movement) and a showdown inspection of clothing. On 23 November the advance party departed for the mobilization station and on the following day, the brigade deployed 985 personnel to the mobilization station, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During the period from 25 November to 15 December 1990 the 142d FA Bde was validated by the mobilization station. The validation process consisted of POM, NBC validation testing/training, and individual and crew served weapons qualification. The brigade also received mission critical

equipment which included Light TACFIRE (LTACFIRE), VINSON secure devices, FM radio multiplexers, Metro MDS, EPSON laptop computers, photocopy machines, and others. Training highlights included LTACFIRE operator training and CPX, NBC, MDS, and unique ammunition characteristics training. Also during this period all the unit equipment was painted desert sand and railloaded. The equipment was shipped by train from the MOB station to Houston and Galveston, TX between 11-15 December

1990. The brigade task organization at this time was as follows: 142d FA BDE comprised of 1-142d FA (M203, SP); 1-158 FA (MLRS) OK ARNG; 2-142d FA (M203, SP); E/333 TAB (AC) Ft Lewis, WA. HHB, 142d Bde and the brigade quartering party departed the MOB station for Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from 14 to 16 January 1991 and arrived during 15 to 20 January. The quartering party arrived at King Fahad International Airport on 15 January at the "MGM Grand Hotel," or Khobar towers, Dammam,

Destroyed vehicles along with a T-55 tank one mile north of Kuwait City on the highway that linked Kuwait City with Al Basrah, Iraq






Iraqi POWs Captured by the 142d FA Bde on day two of the ground war. Food and water were a high priority.

Saudi Arabia. There was a total of 1481 personnel deployed from the MOB station. This figure included attached units and unit replacements received at MOB station. The brigade departed the "MGM Grand Hotel" on 29 January and arrived at FAA (forward assembly area) HAWG, over 314 miles away, the following day. 1-158 arrived at FAA HAWG on 3 February. FAA HAWG was located approximately 10 km west of Hafar Al Batin. COL Linch later cited two reasons for departing the MGM prior to the port arrival of the howit-

zers and majority of the wheeled vehicles. It was the intention of COL Linch to keep the brigade together as a unit and acclimate personnel to the harsh desert environment. At this time the brigade was given the mission to provide general support reinforcing (GSR) fires to the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). The brigade used what haul capacity it had to transport ammunition for other units within the 1st ID DIVARTY until the howitzers and MLRS launchers arrived at port. While at FAA HAWG, late in the evening of 4 February, 1-142d fired a

warning shot at a local intruder attempting to drive into their area. The terrorist threat level was high and internal security was primary in importance. On 7 February, Cpt John Brady was placed in command of HHB, 142d. On the same day the Brigade received it's first "mail call." The lack of mail to this point had been a real morale detractor. On 13 February the Cape Capella arrived at port and by 15 February thirteen ammunition carriers arrived at FAA HAWG. Mission critical equipment was now arriving. On 17 February the brigade

Soldiers setting up a shower unit adjacent to the burning oil fields in northern Kuwait




TOC moved north to the CAA (combat assembly area), approximately 70 km to the north. Two days later the howitzers and MLRS launchers arrived at FAA HAWG, combat configured and arrived at the CAA on 21 February 91. The following day the brigade fired its first rounds in combat since 27 July 1953, during the Korean conflict. The Brigade moved the bulk of its rolling stock and howitzers over 400 miles, configured for combat, and fired its first shot into Iraq in less than 5 days. This would later be considered one of the most significant tasks the brigade accomplished. Prior to the beginning of the ground operation the brigade participated in two days of artillery raids firing 12 missions with a total of

309 rounds. The brigade was organized for combat as follows:- Prior to G-Day - HHB, 142d FA Bde; 1-142d FA (M203, SP); 2-142d FA (M203, SP). From 25 Feb to 8 Mar - HHB, 142d FA Bde; 1- 142d FA (M203, SP); 2-142d FA (M203, SP); 6-27 TAB (-). Operation Desert Sabre, or G-Day, commenced on the morning of 24 February. What was intended as an intense 2 1/2 hour artillery prep (peparation) that the 142d FA Bde was to participate in to support the initial ground attack at the breach site was significantly shortened to a 30 minute prep. The brigade did not receive the change to the prep until the morning of the 24th leaving barely enough time to recompute a new fire plan and transmit it to the battalions which were

on the move. The battalions were in position within time and did participate in the artillery prep. In the early evening hours of 24 February, the 142d FA Bde passed through the breach created by the 1st ID and was on Iraqi soil for the first time. The location given to the brigade to position itself once through the breach was covered with unexploded friendly DPICM ordnance, as well as many bunkers with unexploded enemy ordnance. It was at this time that the brigade sustained its only casualties. There were three soldiers injured by unexploded DPICM. One lost his hand, the other an eye, and the third suffered minor injuries to his leg and did not need immediate medical evacuation. It was confirmed prior to passing through the breach that the 142d would be providing reinforcing fires to the 1st (UK) Armored Division. Once through the breach the British Liaison team that had been attached to the brigade TOC briefed the follow on mission to the brigade commander and staff. It was the consensus of the commander and staff that the British plan was sound, easy to understand and follow. The graphics provided were transposed over a 1:100,000 map sheet and were easy to follow. It is interesting to note that there were no written orders received from the British.

At this time the 1st (UK) AD was given the mission to sweep laterally from west to east just behind elements of 6 Iraqi Divisions, which included 5 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division. The primary objective for the first 24 hours was Objective Brass. It was a very large position which contained the major portion of the Iraqi 52nd Armored brigade, 52d Armored Division. These positions consisted of fighting positions that included T-55 tanks, MTLB Russian personnel carriers, various artillery and dismounted infantry in deeply entrenched positions. Late in the evening on 24 February the brigade fired it's first missions in support of the British. The missions included both 8 inch and MLRS rockets. It began to rain during the evening and persisted throughout the night until the next morning. At 242200 the Brigade received a movement order, but the actual movement did not take place until BMNT on 25 February. For the next three days no fewer than four moves were made by the brigade. From G-Day to the ceasefire there were a total of 41 missions fired with a total of 682 rounds. During the early morning hours on 27 February the 142d participated in it's largest concentration of artillery fires of the campaign. The British were to attack objective Tungsten which included remnants of the Iraqi



12th Armored Division and reserves from the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. As part of the artillery barrage the British artillery commander requested a battery six be fired from A/1-158 FA. The British were informed that this quantity of rockets would bring the total rounds fired from the launchers to a point where the safety shields would require changing, removing the battery from the battle for a period of at least 12 hours. Due to the significance of this objective, the mission was ordered without hesitation. It was later stated by BG Hammerbeck, the commander of the 4th (UK) Armored brigade, that "Talking to an Iraqi artillery commander

after the war, he told me that 90 percent of his crews on that position had been killed or wounded when the initial bombardment went in. He, lost more than 70 guns in the space of an hour, which was a pretty major achievement."

MG R. A. Smith, the commander of the 1st (UK) Armored Division stated "Your timely and accurate fire supporting 4th Armored brigade as it fought through its objectives contributed significantly to the lightness of our casualties and the swift and crushing victory." On the morning of 28 February the brigade received word that a temporary cease-fire was to

take place at 0800. While with the 1st (UK) AD, the 142d had advanced more than 150 miles in 97 hours. During this period of time only one howitzer became inoperable, but was able to be towed in position and fired. That day the brigade received the order to move to an objective within Kuwait. On the morning of 28 February we moved to a position just east of the Wadi Al Batin within Kuwait and were ordered to stop. It was at this position that the British Liaison team, headed by CPT Mark O'Brian, presented the brigade with the Union Jack flag that flew during the entire campaign. This flag now hangs in the foyer in the Fayetteville Guard Armory. We stopped at that position for one night and the following day, on 1 March, moved to a new position well within Kuwait adjacent to the burning oil fields. Also on this day our mission changed and we were once again given the mission to provide general support reinforcing fires to the 1st ID (Mech). On a clear night with the wind blowing from west to east, as many as 79 burning wells could be counted on the horizon from the exterior of the oil field. The brigade remained adjacent to the oil fields until 11 March. At that time the brigade moved due north to a new position approximately one mile from the Iraqi border. We were to

provide supporting fires for the defense of the new DML (demarkation line). What was reported as a transportation unit had moved to a position in the neutral area adjacent to the DML and was ordered to move north or be destroyed. They moved within the allotted time and no missions were fired from this position. The brigade received the order to depart Kuwait and return to Iraq within the 1st ID FAA ALLEN. On the morning of 20 March the brigade departed Kuwait and arrived at FAA ALLEN midday on 22 March. The brigade remained at FAA ALLEN until 15 April 1991. While at FAA ALLEN E/333 TAB and the remainder of 1-158 were reattached to the brigade for redeployment home. The stay at FAA ALLEN was highlighted with a livefire exercise that fired every type weapons system within the brigade on Iraqi soil. On the morning of 15 April the brigade began the journey from FAA ALLEN back to RAA HUEBNER in Saudi Arabia and arrived on the morning of 17 April. At this time the brigade began intense preparation for redeployment home. The Brigade personnel were divided into three groups at this time. This consisted of the main body, trail party, and PSA (port support activity) personnel. The main body was to depart King Khalid Military City once the

air flow became available. The trail party was to drive the rolling stock to port and depart Saudi Arabia from King Fahad International airport, and the PSA personnel were to drive the equipment from the sterile area onto the ships. The trail party departed RAA HEUBNER at 051600 May and remained at the intersection of MSR DRUMFIRE and TAPLINE road until 060600 then departed for the port of Jubail. The trail party closed at the port on the same day. Every vehicle within the brigade received a thorough washing to pass USDA inspection. The wash rack operation was completed on 11 May and at 142400 May the tail party departed King Fahad International Airport for home with 1048 personnel. The main body departed RAA HEUBNER at 061430 May 91 and arrived at King Khalid Military City at 1600 on the same day. The main body remained at that location until departing Saudi Arabia on 10 May with 364 personnel. The trail party arrived at Ft Sill, OK on 14 May and on 3 July the brigade was officially released from active duty and returned to Arkansas Army National Guard Status. On 25 July 91 the 13 PSA personnel returned to Fort Sill, OK. With the return of the PSA personnel, all 142d FA Bde personnel were home.

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Your contribution to the Arkansas Militia Heritage Preservation Foundation will aid in the effort to preserve Lloyd England Hall. This historical structure was built in 1931 and is one of the oldest remaining building sites on Camp Joseph T. Robinson. Lloyd England Hall is the proposed home of the Arkansas National Guard Museum. This museum will house historical artifacts and documents depicting the story of the Arkansas National Guard from its inception to the present.

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P.O. Box 2200
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
North Little Rock, AR 72118-2200

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

From the Official Citation for the Award of the Medal of Honor





Maurice "Footsie" Britt

Place and date: North of Mignano, Italy, 10 November 1943. Entered service at: Lonoke, Arkansas Birth: Carlisle, Ark. G.O. No.: 23, 24 March 1944. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty. Disdaining enemy hand grenades and close-range machine pistol, machinegun, and rifle fire, Lieutenant Britt inspired and led a handful of his men in repelling a bitter counterattack by approximately 100 Germans against his company positions north of Mignano, Italy, the morning of 10 November 1943. During his wounds, for which he refused to accept medical attention until ordered to do so by his battalion commander following the battle, he personally killed 5 and wounded an unknown number of Germans, wiped out one enemy machine-gun crew, fired 5 clips of carbine and an undetermined amount of M1 rifle ammunition, and threw 32 fragmentation grenades. His bold, aggressive actions, utterly disregarding superior enemy numbers, resulted in capture of four Germans, two of them wounded, and

enabled several captured Americans to escape. Lieutenant Britt's undaunted courage and prowess in arms were largely respon-

sible for repulsing a German counterattack which, if successful, would have isolated his battalion and destroyed his company.

Arkansas Military Insignia

	<p>142A 142d FIELD ARTY BDE (A)</p> <p>Between two gold incised fleurs-de-lis, the dexter French, the sinister Italian, a red lozenge with dark blue border bearing a bend surmounted by an incised shell, both gold. The motto "ANSWERS THE CALL" is gold on two pierced red scrolls. (25 x 33mm)</p>
	<p>142B 142d FIELD ARTILLERY (A)</p> <p>On a gold shield between six black discs a red pile charged with a red fleur-de-lis on a gold lozenge; in base a red and dark blue taeguk. The motto "TRY TO STOP US" is gold on a pierced red scroll. (29 x 28mm)</p>
	<p>936A 936th FIELD ARTY BN (A)</p> <p>On a transparent red shield in dexter chief a sheathed Roman sword palewise, in sinister chief a cattle skull above a prickly pear cactus and in base a fleur-de-lis, all gold. The motto "TRY TO STOP US" is gold on a red scroll. (28 x 22mm)</p>
	<p>937A 937th FIELD ARTY BN (C)</p> <p>On a red shield in chief a sheathed Roman sword palewise and a cattle skull above a prickly pear cactus, in base a fleur-de-lis, all gold; all within a red and gold gyronny border. The motto "SANS PAREIL" (Without equal) is gold on a pierced red scroll. (29 x 30mm)</p>