

Arkansas Military History Journal

A Publication of the
Arkansas National Guard Museum, Inc.

Vol. 10

Summer 2016

No. 3



OPERATION DESERT STORM

Arkansas Citizen Soldiers Respond to the Call

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Cover Photograph: Post Card found in the Arkansas National Guard Museum Collection
(2008.08) - Desert Storm, 21 December 1990—Operation Desert Storm.

Message from the Editor

My Take on Desert Storm from Afar

For those of us old enough to remember the Gulf War, or Desert Storm, as many of us know it, it was a new kind of war and much of this had to do with the fact that it was televised daily 24/7 on CNN. Many of us watched and admired General Norman Schwarzkopf and General Colin Powell as they gave their daily briefings to the press. And many of us learned new phrases such as “scud missile.” But it was also the first patriotic war that many of us could remember. I was born in 1961, and my reference for a war was Vietnam, an extremely unpopular war that was depicted as such during the nightly evening news. When the most trusted man in America, Walter Cronkite, said America was losing in Vietnam, people believed him. Of course, World War II was a patriotic war for the United States, but it was not televised. And Korea took place in the early 1950s during the infancy of T.V., and had little media impact. And not long after the war began much of the reporting was relegated to the inside pages of many newspapers. But in the early 1990s, we could watch American fighters bombing their targets almost as soon as they happened. We said it looked like a video game. In Vietnam, we fought against communism, but most didn’t identify that with an individual, however evil Americans viewed that ideology. But in Desert Storm, our evil enemy was an individual – Saddam Hussein. And Americans could understand that fight. Finally, in the end, the war ended before it could become unpopular with Americans. Before we could take a second breath it was over, and during the next several months we welcomed our troops back as true heroes. WE WON! In Vietnam, many Americans viewed it as a defeat, and the fighting continued for years, and when we left in 1973, we hadn’t won. And two years later, Saigon fell to the communists and I don’t remember most Americans concerned enough to care. So Desert Storm was different for us. We could again feel proud of our troops, and, I think, Americans began to reevaluate our troops who fought in Vietnam and better appreciate their service to the United States. And THAT mission is still ongoing.

Dr. Raymond Screws

Editor/Arkansas National Guard Museum Director

Message from the Chair

We celebrate the 25th anniversary of Operation Desert Storm this year. We dedicate this edition of the *Arkansas Military History Journal* to the men and women who answered the call and performed with distinction and honor throughout both Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and follow-on operations, often called the "Gulf War." My memories of the Gulf War started with a phone call on a Saturday morning about a week prior to the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade's mobilization in November 1991. The caller was LTC William D. Wofford, my battalion commander in the 5-206th Field Artillery. He told me about the alert and stated that he had a few slots open and asked if I would like to mobilize with the brigade. I told him, "Give me a little time to think about it." Later that day, LTC Wofford called back. He wasn't calling about my decision, but with instructions to be at the 2-142nd armory in Fort Smith on the following Monday, two days later. By May of 1991, when the brigade redeployed, I had seen and done more that I could have ever imagined. I had the good fortune of being assigned as a battalion and brigade liaison officer, which ultimately led to an assignment with the British 1st Armoured Division Artillery. It was there that I met Ian Durie, the Division Artillery commander, at the onset of the Corps artillery preparatory fires, next to his Warrior track. He offered me a cup of hot tea from his canteen cup as we watched the vast array of artillery firing for the next hour. For a 26 year-old Captain from Arkansas, this was the start of a big adventure. Ian Durie would ultimately make Major General, then became an Anglican minister and outspoken opponent of war after retiring from the military. Reverend Durie died in a car wreck in Romania in 2005, at the age of 60. Such is the rich history borne out of our American experiences in war.

BG Keith A. Klemmer

Arkansas National Guard Museum Foundation Chair


Table of Contents

Arkansas' Big Guns in the Gulf.....	6
100 Hours with Light TACFIRE.....	11
148th EVAC	17
Arkansas Units Mobilized for Operation Desert Shield/Storm	32
Welcoming Home Our Arkansas Soldiers and Airmen	37
Featured Artifact: Howitzer Self-Propelled, M110A2.....	40
Featured Photograph	43

Arkansas' Big Guns in the Gulf

From the Official After Action Report Records

142nd FA BRIGADE (ARK NG) and LTACFIRE "Winners in Desert Storm"



Originally Published in the Arkansas Military Journal

Winter 1992 Edition

Available for Review at the Arkansas National Guard Museum

At 151415 November 1990 the alert notice was received that the 142d Field Artillery Brigade, comprised of HHB, 1-142d FA, and 2-142d FA, would be federally mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield. On the same day COL Charles L. Linch assumed command of the brigade. Six days later on the 21st of November the brigade received the federal mobilization order. There were 1140 personnel assigned to the brigade upon notification. Activities at home station included an initial POM (preparation for overseas movement) and a showdown inspection of clothing. On 23 November the advance party departed for the mobilization station and on the following day, the brigade deployed 985 personnel to the mobilization station, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During the period from 25 November to 15 December 1990 the 142d FA Bde was validated by the mobilization station. The validation process consisted of POM, NBC validation testing/training, and individual and crew served weapons qualification. The brigade also received mission critical equipment which included Light TACFIRE (LTACFIRE), VINSON secure devices, FM radio multiplexers, Metro MDS, EPSON laptop computers, photocopy machines, and others. Training highlights included LTAC-FIRE operator training and CPX, NBC, MDS, and unique ammunition characteristics training. Also during this period

all the unit equipment was painted desert sand and rail-loaded. The equipment was shipped by train from the MOB station to Houston and Galveston, TX between 11-15 December 1990. The brigade task organization at this time was as follows: 142d FA BDE comprised of 1-142d FA (M203, SP); 1-158 FA (MLRS) OK ARNG; 2-142d FA (M203, SP); E/333 TAB (AC) Ft Lewis, WA. HHB, 142d Bde and the brigade quartering party departed the MOB station for Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from 14 to 16 January 1991 and arrived during 15 to 20 January. The quartering party arrived at King Fahad International Airport on 15 January at the "MGM Grand Hotel," or Khobar towers, Dammam, Saudi Arabia. There was a total of 1481 personnel deployed from the MOB station. This figure included attached units and unit replacements received at MOB station. The brigade departed the "MGM Grand Hotel" on 29 January and arrived at FAA (forward assembly area) HAWG, over 314 miles away, the following day. 1-158 arrived at FAA HAWG on 3 February. FAA HAWG was located approximately 10 km west of Hafar Al Batin. COL Linch later cited two reasons for departing the MGM prior to the port arrival of the howitzers and majority of the wheeled vehicles. It was the intention of

COL Linch to keep the brigade together as a unit and acclimate personnel to the harsh desert environment. At this time the brigade was given the mission to provide general support reinforcing (GSR) fires to the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). The brigade used what haul capacity it had to transport ammunition for other units within the



The Arkansas National Guard used T-55 Tanks near Kuwait City close the highway that linked Kuwait City with Al Basrah, Iraq.

1st ID DIVARTY until the howitzers and MLRS launchers arrived at port. While at FAA HAWG, late in the evening of 4 February, 1-142d fired a warning shot at a local intruder attempting to drive into their area. The terrorist threat level was high and internal security was primary in importance. On 7 February, Cpt. John Brady was placed in command of HHB, 142d. On the same day the Brigade received its first "mail call." The lack of mail to this point had been a real morale detractor. On 13 February the Cape Capella arrived at port and by 15 February thirteen ammunition carriers arrived at FAA HAWG. Mission critical equipment was now arriving.

On 17 February the brigade TOC moved north to the CAA (combat assembly area), approximately 70 km to the north. Two days later the howitzers and MLRS launchers arrived at FAA HAWG, combat configured and arrived at the CAA on 21 February 91. The following day the brigade fired its first rounds in combat since 27 July 1953, during

the Korean conflict. The Brigade moved the bulk of its rolling stock and howitzers over 400 miles, configured for combat, and fired its first shot into Iraq in less than 5 days. This would later be considered one of the most significant tasks the brigade accomplished. Prior to the beginning of the ground operation the brigade participated in two days of artillery raids firing 12 missions with a total of 309 rounds. The brigade was organized for combat as follows: Prior to G-Day—HHB, 142d FA Bde; 1-142d FA (M203, SP); 2-142d FA (M203, SP). From 25 Feb to 8 Mar - HHB, 142d FA Bde; 1- 142d FA (M203, SP); 2-142d FA (M203, SP); 6-27 TAB (-). Operation Desert Sabre, or G-Day, commenced on the morning of 24 February. What was intended as an intense 2 1/2 hour artillery prep (preparation) that the 142d FA Bde was to participate

in to support the initial ground attack at the breach site was significantly shortened to a 30 minute prep. The brigade did not receive the change to the prep



"Steel Rain" by Frank Thomas

until the morning of the 24th leaving barely enough time to recompute a new fire plan and transmit it to the battalions which were on the move. The battalions were in position within time and did participate in the artillery prep. In the early evening hours of 24 February, the 142d FA Bde passed through the breach created by the 1st ID and was on Iraqi soil for the first time. The location given to the brigade to position itself once through the breach was covered with unexploded friendly DPICM ordnance, as well as many bunkers with unexploded enemy ordnance. It was at this time that the brigade sustained its only casualties. There were three soldiers injured by unexploded DPICM. One lost his hand, the other an eye, and the third suffered minor injuries to his leg and did not need immediate medical evacuation. It was

confirmed prior to passing through the breach that the 142d would be providing reinforcing fires to the 1st (UK) Armored Division. Once through the

breach the British Liaison team that had been attached to the brigade TOC briefed the follow on mission to the brigade commander and staff. It was the consensus of the commander and staff that the British plan was sound, easy to understand and follow. The graphics provided were trans-

posed over a 1:100,000 map sheet and were easy to follow. It is interesting to note that there were no written orders received from the British.

At this time the 1st (UK) AD was given the mission to sweep laterally from west to east just behind elements of 6 Iraqi Divisions, which included 5 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division. The primary objective for the first 24 hours was Objective Brass. It was a very large position which contained the major portion of the Iraqi 52nd Armored brigade, 52d Armored Division. These positions consisted of fighting positions that included T-55 tanks, MTLB Russian personnel carriers, various artillery and dismounted infantry in deeply entrenched positions. Late in the evening on 24 February the brigade fired its first missions in support of the British. The missions included both 8 inch and MLRS rockets. It began to rain

during the evening and persisted throughout the night until the next morning. At 242200 the Brigade received a movement order, but the actual movement did not take place until BMNT on 25 Febru-

artillery commander after the war, he told me that 90 percent of his crews on that position had been killed or wounded when the initial bombardment went in. He, lost more than 70 guns in the space of

porary cease-fire was to take place at 0800. While with the 1st (UK) AD, the 142d had advanced more than 150 miles in 97 hours. During this period of time only one howitzer became inoperable, but was able to be towed in position and fired. That day the brigade received the order to move to an objective within Kuwait. On the morning of 28 February we moved to a position just east of the Wadi Al Batin within Kuwait and were ordered to stop. It was at this position that the British Liaison team, headed by CPT Mark O'Brian, presented the brigade with the Union Jack flag that flew during the entire campaign. This flag now hangs in the foyer in the Fayetteville Guard Armory. We stopped at that position for one night and the following day, on 1 March, moved to a new position well within Kuwait adjacent to the burning oil fields. Also on this day our mission changed and we were once again given the mission to provide general support reinforcing fires to the 1st ID (Mech). On a clear night with the wind blowing from west to east, as many as 79 burning welts could



Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

ary. For the next three days no fewer than four moves were made by the brigade. From G-Day to the ceasefire there were a total of 41 missions fired with a total of 682 rounds. During the early morning hours on 27 February the 142d participated in its largest concentration of artillery fires of the campaign. The British were to attack objective Tungsten, which included remnants of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division and reserves from the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. As part of the artillery barrage the British artillery commander requested a battery six be fired from A/1-158 FA. The British were informed that this quantity of rockets would bring the total rounds fired from the launchers to a point where the safety shields would require changing, removing the battery from the battle for a period of at least 12 hours. Due to the significance of this objective, the mission was ordered without hesitation. It was later stated by BG Hammerbeck, the commander of the 4th (UK) Armored brigade, that "Talking to an Iraqi

an hour, which was a pretty major achievement."

MG R. A. Smith, the commander of the 1st (UK) Armored Division stated "Your timely and accurate fire supporting 4th Armored brigade as it fought through its objectives contributed significantly to the lightness of our casualties and the swift and crushing victory." On the morning of 28 February the brigade received word that a tem-



Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

142nd FA deploys to "DESERT STORM"

On short notice, the 142nd FA Brigade, consisting of 1-142nd, 2-142nd 8" Howitzer Battalions (ARK NG) and 1-158 MLRS Battalion (OK NG), deployed to Operation Desert Storm. Commanded by Col Jerry Linch of Arkansas, the brigade performed admirably and fired thousands of rounds in support of 7th Corps operations.

All of these missions were controlled by the brigade's Light TACFIRE (LTACFIRE) C³ System which enabled the brigade to process complex fire missions in seconds and operate "on the move". The 142nd was fielded with and trained on LTACFIRE in less than 30 days.

LTACFIRE was critical to the 142nd FA success, since not only did it permit the C³ interoperability within the brigade (shown above), e.g. the critical links to BCS/MLRS, but also provided full digital interoperability with the heavy TACFIRE equipped active divisions.

The tremendous success of the 142nd FA Brigade was a **leading example** of Army National Guard support of Operation Desert Storm.

Lightweight TACFIRE (LTACFIRE)

Desert Storm Deployments:

- 8 systems 142nd FA BDE (ARK NG)
- 6 systems 18th FA BDE (Ft Bragg, NC)
- 53 systems 10th, 11th 12th Reg (USMC)
Total = 67 systems in "Desert Storm"
(18th FA BDE (Army) and USMC enjoyed similar success with LTACFIRE)

Key Operational Features:

- Fully "MIL-SPEC"; *on the move* operations
- Interoperable with all FA C³ systems
- Provides automated fire planning
- Provides automated tactical fire control
- Artillery target intelligence
- Support geometry; graphics at all nodes

LTACFIRE Program Status:

- 9th, 7th, 10th, 25th Army Divisions fielded
- 82nd, 101st, 6th, 29th (NG), scheduled
- 10th, 11th, 12th Reg (USMC) fielded
- 142nd FA BDE fielded
- NG has resolved to field LTACFIRE to all NG Arty units (BN and above)

Litton

Data Systems

be counted on the horizon from the exterior of the oil field. The brigade remained adjacent to the oil fields until 11 March. At that time the brigade moved due north to a new position approximately one mile from the Iraqi border. We were to provide supporting fires for the defense of the new DML (demarcation line). What was reported as a transportation unit had moved to a position in the neutral area adjacent to the DML and was ordered to move north or be destroyed. They moved within the allotted time and no missions were fired from this position. The brigade received the order to depart Kuwait and return to Iraq within the 1st ID FAA ALLEN. On the morning of 20 March the brigade departed Kuwait and arrived at FAA ALLEN midday on 22 March. The brigade remained at FAA ALLEN until 15 April 1991. While at FAA ALLEN E/333 TAB and the remainder of 1-158 were reattached to the brigade for redeployment home. The

stay at FAA ALLEN was highlighted with a live fire exercise that fired every type weapons system within the brigade on Iraqi soil. On the morning of 15 April the brigade began the journey from FAA ALLEN back to RAA HUEBNER in Saudi Arabia and arrived on the morning of 17 April. At this time the brigade began intense preparation for redeployment home. The Brigade personnel were divided into three groups at this time. This consisted of the main body, trail party, and PSA (port support activity) personnel. The main body was to depart King Khalid Military City once the air flow became available. The trail party was to drive the rolling stock to port and depart Saudi Arabia from King Fahad International airport, and the PSA personnel were to drive the equipment from the sterile area onto the ships. The trail party departed RAA HEUBNER at 051600 May and remained at the intersection of MSR DRUMFIRE and TA-

PLINE road until 060600 then departed for the port of Jubail. The trail party closed at the port on the same day. Every vehicle within the brigade received a thorough washing to pass USDA inspection. The wash rack operation was completed on 11 May and at 142400 May the tail party departed King Fahad International Airport for home with 1048 personnel. The main body departed RAA HEUBNER at 061430 May 91 and arrived at King Khalid Military City at 1600 on the same day. The main body remained at that location until departing Saudi Arabia on 10 May with 364 personnel. The trail party arrived at Ft Sill, OK on 14 May and on 3 July the brigade was officially released from active duty and returned to Arkansas Army National Guard Status. On 25 July 91 the 13 PSA personnel returned to Fort Sill, OK. With the return of the PSA personnel, all 142d FA Bde personnel were home. ■

100 HOURS WITH LIGHT TACFIRE

**By CPT Richard Needham and MAJ Russell Graves
142d FA Brigade, Arkansas Army National Guard**



Photo: A destroyed Iraqi tank rests near a series of oil-well fires during the Gulf War, on 9 March 1991, in northern Kuwait.

“This is going to be close,” announced the 142nd Brigade S-3. “I can’t believe it. We’ve been working on this prep for over a week, and now this.” The Brigade S-3 had a good reason for concern. The Prep started in less than an hour. Even if he had it computed, both cannon battalions were moving. They could not be in place for at least 30 more minutes. Deleting the 2 1/2 hour prep, the Brigade operations cell recomputed the fire plan from a completely new target list. The sweat beaded up on the Assistant S-3’s forehead as he shouted orders, and coached the operations section to complete the computations. He had a reason to sweat. This wasn’t another exercise or ARTEP. This was the Prep for the 1st Infantry Division’s breach at the start of Operation Desert Sabre.

A few short weeks ago the task would have been impossible. The Brigade would have manually computed the Prep, and then sent it to the Battalions by voice. The Battalions would then send it to their firing batteries by voice. At the battery Fire Direction Center (FDC), the Battery Computer System (BCS) would compute it and send the data to the guns. There wasn’t enough time for that now. The minutes ticked by too fast. Suddenly the radio broke squelch on the Brigade-CF2. It wasn’t voice. It was the eerie sound that only digital traffic can make. At 1200 bytes per second the operations section started transmitting the prep to the moving Battalion Tactical Operation Centers (TOC’s). The S-3 smiled for the first time in hours. “That has to be the sweetest sound in the world right now,” he said as the Acknowledgements (Acks) came resounding back.

Minutes later, a printer came alive in the operations van. AFU:UPDATES from the battalions started coming in. Everyone watched the clock and held their breath. The concussions rocked the vans before the radio announced “Shot Over.” The S-3 looked up from his watch. “Right on time,” he said. Light TACFIRE (LTACFIRE) had passed the first of many tests it would face in the next 100 hours.

When the 142nd (National Guard) Field Artillery Brigade received its mobilization orders on 21 November

*Originally Published in the Arkansas Military Journal
Fall 1993 Edition*

Available for Review at the Arkansas National Guard Museum

1990, it was strictly a manual TOC. Rotations to NTC with the 1st Infantry Division and the 3rd ACR uncovered a serious flaw in the Army's Total Force concept. Manual TOC's didn't have a place in the digital realm. Heavy TACFIRE equipped units didn't have the time nor assets to interface with manual TOC's. To keep up during NTC rotations, this Brigade would borrow a heavy TACFIRE system with operators to interface with their regular army counterparts. Because of the massive deployment of artillery units to the Persian Gulf heavy TACFIRE systems with trained operators were not available to borrow.



Self-propelled howitzer of 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, Arkansas National Guard, moves toward enemy position during first day of ground war. (photo by Maj. Kim Kimmey, published in On Guard: Desert Storm Special, December 1991.)

The Brigade's only hope was to find enough light TACFIRE's (LTACFIRE's) to field the brigade and two Battalion TOC's. The search began immediately. Litton sent instructors to train our operators with loaned LTACFIRE's. Then the miracle happened. On 10 December, the search located the much needed sets. On 28 December, the equipment arrived and the 142nd hand-receipted for them.

The briefcase terminals (BCTs) are very light weight, mobile and self-contained. They require only a printer as a peripheral device. The BCT could operate with either a commercial or a heavy TACFIRE's electric line printer (ELP). One much needed peripheral device was a separate keyboard. Without the keyboard, operators performed all operations by finger-pushing the screen much like the Dismal Message Device (DMD) device. This slowed most operations, especially plain text messages (PTM's).

The BCT's at the operations and counter fire cells area marked advantage over the use of the VFMED used in the heavy TACFIRE system. The BCT's software contains its own message formats and memory storage files. This alleviated the total reliance on the FDC computer for this capability. Their ability to operate

independently of the FDC computer added to the total operations. When problems occurred with one BCT, another could do its tasks with minimum loss of operational capabilities. This reduced the likelihood of operating in a degraded mode. At the brigade TOC, each BCT had four modem/net capability, except the counterfire BCT that had only two modems.

This gave the brigade TOC the capability to operate on 14 separate digital nets, either directly or through the relay function. We were breaking new ground. To our knowledge there wasn't a brigade sized unit that had experience using

LTACFIRE. Initially, we went by trial and error. The first decision we made was to configure the BCT's for TOC operations. The package we received included: 1 dual station and 6 single station BCT's. This young group of soldiers, specialists through staff sergeant underwent an intensive training program at Fort Sill to learn and operate the light TACFIRE system. This training consisted of classroom and hands-on instruction.

The first critical problem was to interface with the heavy TACFIRE. Our battery BCS's were using Version 9 tapes, and Litton conducted our LTACFIRE training with Version 9 software. The already deployed VII and XVIII Corps were currently using Version 7, which wouldn't interface with our Version 9 tapes.

The LTACFIRE's Version 7 was inadequate. While it could interface with heavy TACFIRE, it had serious shortcomings in its capabilities. Litton developed Version 8.5, and by deployment time, it was approved for our use. It wasn't as good as Version 9, but it did interface with all the heavy TACFIRE systems. One major shortcoming of Version 8.5 is that it did not provide us with the capability to operate as a DivArty/Brigade computer system. Therefore, the Brigade

FDC had to operate as a battalion computer. The Version 8.5 software did include a Fire Mission (FM; CENTER) file which allowed brigade massing of fires. Another software deficiency for the brigade FDC computer was the lack of an artillery target intelligence (ATI)



Distinctive Unit Insignia for the Arkansas National Guard 142nd Field Artillery

memory storage capability. This required the total reliance upon a heavy TACFIRE computer for all ATI data storage. Message formats and some terminology within light TACFIRE was slightly different from heavy

TACFIRE's, but posed little difficulty.

The training culminated in two rigorous command post exercises (CPXs) integrating LTACFIRE with BCS, MLRS FDS. Fire finder radar, metro's MDS and heavy TACFIRE. With III Corps Artillery's help, these CPX's forced digital integration with all these systems. As the CPX's progressed, we found more to do, increasing our proficiency prior to deployment. The decision to fly the LTACFIRE with the troops, instead of shipping it with our other equipment, gave us more time to solve problem areas.

The brigade soldier's knowledge of manual gunnery assisted them in learning LTACFIRE's capabilities. All they needed to learn was the technical aspects of the system. These dedicated soldiers spent additional hours of their own time to hone in their digital skills.

Making changes on a daily basis occurred as the deployment deadline quickly approached. When something didn't work, we made a change. When it did work, we added it to our virgin SOP. By deployment day, we had settled on the following configuration:

1. Brigade TOC: FDC- 1 dual

station BCT, Counterfire -1 single station BCT, Operations -1 single station BCT.

2. Cannon Battalion TOC: FDC - 1 single station BCT, Operations -1 single station BCT.

The Brigade FDC would control all fire mission processing along with digital communications to higher, lower and supporting FDC's. The Brigade counterfire cell would process all fire plans and command and control information to the Battalions. The Brigade counterfire cell would handle the expected high volume of targets generated by Firefinder's 0-36 and 0-37 radars.

All things worked well, providing a highly trained crew and a good light TACFIRE SOP. Now, after shedding their regular professions as college students, farmers, accountants and lawyers to "Answer the Call", these digitally trained civilian soldiers were ready to defeat Saddam Hussain's army.

READY OR NOT, HERE WE COME!

On 8 January 1991, we packed the BCT's for shipment. In less than 30 days, we had done as much as we could. Thanks to LTACFIRE being "user-friendly", we completed the initial training on LTACFIRE in about a month, a feat that normally takes 13 weeks for heavy TACFIRE operator training. The credit goes to the quality of our soldiers, and the assistance from III Corps Artillery and Litton. They did everything in their power to help us acquire the equipment. Also, they provided on short notice the much needed training materials and technical expertise.



Howitzer of the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, provide intensive fire support for ground operations. (photo by Sgt. Maj. Tom Magnus, published in On Guard: Desert Storm Special, December 1991.)

The Brigade deployed to Saudi Arabia mid-January 1991. A small band of armed soldiers waited expectantly as the dull, green painted TAT bird, a sleek C-141 taxied up the ramp at King Faud airport. It was a welcome sight. The BCTs had arrived at the war zone. The Brigade received its wheeled vehicles



142nd Fires Brigade Shoulder
Sleeve Insignia

and other equipment at the Damman Port.

Carefully, the soldiers loaded the LTACFIRE crated on 5-ton trucks and transported them over 300 miles north and west to Field Assembly Area (FAA) HA WG.

There they in-

stalled the BCT's into the vehicles that would carry them into battle. The installation of the BCT's was not done at Fort Sill since the vehicles shipped out before the unit received its LTACFIRE's.

Never having LTACFIRE mounted in the Expando Vans, installation was from scratch. The soldiers completed the installation process in one day to include establishing the digital link to the VII Corps Artillery heavy TACFIRE via PCM. The establishment of PCM communication provided a challenge. The operators had never seen nor used a PCM, nor were taught about 4-wire communications. Through their persistence, they established and maintained this vital link.

Training with LTACFIRE continued at FAA HAWG. Here the Brigade line tuned its digital skills. The training consisted of dry fire missions, fire plans, command and control, and FM and PCM communication troubleshooting. As with heavy TACFIRE, FM digital communication proved to be a difficult task. Through diligent work, these young digitizers, mastered the art of passing digital traffic consistently over FM and PCM.

The use of multiplexers and the PRM-34 assisted in their efforts to establish and

maintain FM communications. By using one 4-pac and one 5-pac multiplexor, the Brigade TOC needed to erect only two OE-254 antennas. The PRM-34 device made radio troubleshooting quick and easy. At FAA HAWG, we finalized the digital communications net structure.

On 17 February, the Brigade moved forward and linked up with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Prior coordination for subscriber information and radio net assignments enhanced the establishment of initial TACFIRE communication. When the Brigade FDC went "on the air", it established instant digital communications with DivArty. Now the Brigade could receive combat intelligence, battlefield geometry, fire plans and command and control information.

At this location, 1ID DivArty delivered a 2 1/2 hour prep fire plan to the Brigade. The DivArty developed the fire plan by using its heavy TACFIRE system. Due to the fire plan's length and the number of fire units, the fire plan exceeded heavy TACFIRE's capabilities. Therefore, DivArty modified the fire plan and provided a draft copy to each supporting artillery brigade. The artillery brigades each entered the fire plan into their TACFIRE computers and computed it for their units.

142nd's knowledge of manual gunnery and lire planning proved helpful. Entering the 2 1/2 hour prep from scratch into its light TACFIRE, the Brigade comput-



Convoy of M110A2 8 inch howitzer belonging to 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery, conducts a movement during combat operations in support of Operation Desert Storm. (Photo from MikiMedia Commons)



2nd Battalion 142nd Field Artillery Conducts Fire Mission in Support of Operation Desert Storm. (Photo from MikiMedia Commons)

ed it within two hours. They produced a clean schedule of fires (TISF), ready for digital transmission to its battalions.

1ID DivArty made several revisions of the fire plan. Each revision took the master digital fire planners only about 30 minutes to recompute and produce another clean TISF. The 2 1/2 hour fire plan was actually two fire plans, one for 120 minutes and the other for 30 minutes. This was due to the 120 minute limitation for a fire plan in the software.

On 19 February, the tracked vehicles of the 1-142nd, 2-142nd and 1-158th arrived at the Damman port. Seventy-two hours later, they were all sitting in FAA HAWG, 314 miles away. Within 12 hours, the cannon battalions installed the BCT's into their command post carriers making the total digital TACFIRE link complete. For the first time ever, the Brigade practiced the fire plan digitally down to the guns. The speed that LTACFIRE could digitally disseminate the fire plan impressed and pleased the Brigade Commander and S-3. It was much faster than the old manual way.

On 22 February, in less than 24 hours after the three battalions arrived at FAA HAWG and journeyed another 70 KM to join the Brigade TOC, they fired in the artillery raids. For the 142nd, it was the first rounds ever fired with the use of light TACFIRE and the first rounds fired in combat since the Korean War.

On 24 February 1991, at 0300, 1 ID DivArty finalized the fire plan and the much trained for 100 hours began. As general support reinforcing to the 1st In-

fantry Division Artillery, the 142nd FA Brigade roared into combat. Digital music soared through the airwaves with command and control information, AFU's, fire missions, MET messages and more. At times, when voice communications failed, the digital link prevailed, providing a continuous link for commanders and S-3's.

The battalions received the fire plan digitally, then the guns and launchers fired. The accurate and deadly fire from the 8-inch howitzers and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) devastated the enemy's positions and their will to fight. The 1st Infantry Division, aided by the 142nd's cannon and missile fires, rolled virtually unopposed through the breach area.

Upon passing through the breach, the VII Corps Artillery commander task organized the Brigade, with it retaining both 8-inch howitzer battalions and one MLRS battery. The new mission was to reinforce the 1st United Kingdom (UK) Armored Division Artillery. On 25 February, the Brigade continued its offensive march to battle with the 1st UK. The 1st (UK) DivArty did not have TACFIRE, therefore, positioned Liaison Officers (LNO's) inside the FDC van.

The Brigade FDC would receive the fire missions voice from the British LNO's. As the target was being manually plotted, the fire control BCT operator furiously punched in the data. Upon receipt of the fire order from the FDO, the BCT operator then transmitted the fire mission digitally. A clean "Ack" would bring a grin to the Comms BCT operator's face. The distant thunder of the units firing brought smiles to all, for they knew the 142nd's steel on target would

quicken the drive in smashing Saddam's army.

"Fire Mission", the LNO would yell in response to the radio message from their famed British Desert Rats. "Plot", cried out the FDO in response. Activity suddenly energized as the BCT operators swung into action. The FDO issued the fire order announcing "Brigade 6 rounds". The BCT operator completed the FM: RFAF and transmitted it to the battalions. "Ack Diamond Fire, Ack Fireball, Ack Gater", shouted the Comms BCT operator as the fire mission printed out on the ELP. Tensely, the seconds pass, until the distant thunder of the two 8-inch cannon battalions roar out with 2 volleys each. The MLRS completed the Brigade mass with the WHOOSH of their rockets. "End of Mission", the FDO announced upon receipt of "Rounds complete". A few minutes of silence prevails in the LTACFIRE FDC van, only to be broken again by "Fire Mission". Moving, shooting and communicating, 24 hours a day, such went the 100 hour war.

The timely accurate fires from the Brigade's long-range artillery brought high praises from the British. The 142nd's support to them in their drive to and through Saddam's forces enhanced Anglo-American relations. The 1st (UK) Armored Division was able to quickly rout the enemy with minimum casualties to its own forces.

On 28 February 1991, at 0700, the 100 hours ended with the Brigade receiving notification of the cease-fire. In those 100 hours, the Brigade had fired over 1000 rounds of 8-inch and MRLS. It moved twelve times, fighting in three countries, ending in Kuwait.

It provided artillery support to both the 1st Infantry Division (TACFIRE equipped) and the 1st (UK) Armored Division (non-TACFIRE equipped). It maintained a 100% operational readiness rating with all digital systems. A key point is that the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade maintained a 100% interface and communications link between its light TACFIRE computers and the heavy TACFIRE digital systems without the use of light TACFIRE, none of this could have been possible.

Though the 100 hours was short induration, the perfection of the Brigade's digital execution resulted from the numerous hours of training and determination of its soldiers to make the system work. The 142nd (National Guard) Field Artillery Brigade proved that it was ready to "Answer the Call".

The 142nd FA Brigade consists of the Brigade headquarters from Fayetteville, Arkansas and two 8-inch self-propelled howitzer battalions. 1-142nd and 2-142nd from Harrison and Fort Smith, Arkansas. The 1-158th (MLRS) FA Battalion, from Lawton, Oklahoma, rounded out the brigade and made the 142nd a heavy artillery brigade. The 1-158th is normally assigned to the 45th Oklahoma National Guard Division. The activation, train-up, integration and deployment proved a challenging task for these National Guardsmen and women. The dedication and leadership of the officers, NCO's and soldiers enabled them to take the challenge head-on and prove their capabilities as part of the "Total Force" Army. ■



Howitzer Section Number 1, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery, Arkansas Army National Guard, Operation Desert Storm. Crew Members: SSG Robert Sampley, Jackie Hickey, Stanley Henson, JR Rankin, and Earl Duty. (Photo from MikiMedia Commons)

148th EVAC

Desert Storm - Saudi Arabia



Aerial view of the 148th EVAC Unit in Saudi Arabia—Desert Storm. (Photo from Arkansas National Guard Museum Collection 2006.42.01)

Stories Originally Published in the “148th Evacuation Hospital Desert Storm Story”

*This publication is available for review at the Arkansas National Guard Museum.
There were so many great stories, but we could only choose a few for this publication.*

THE PROCESSING

By CPT Max D. Easter

Seventeen and eighteen November 1990 were the unit's regularly scheduled drill dates. The unit arrived and began POM processing. All support personnel arrived as scheduled. The unit personnel conducted the medical records review and immunizations. A 100% showdown inspection, MPRJ review, health and dental records check, shot record update, wills and powers of attorney completion, and a PFR review and update were accomplished for all assigned personnel during the next two days.

Once into the mobilization process it became apparent that many of the personnel had not adequately prepared for this day. The JAG office was quiet busy making wills and powers-of-attorney and many of the Family Care Plans were not well thought out and had to be re-executed. As a result, two Family Care Plans failed and the soldiers were discharged.

The mobilization process at Camp Robinson was extremely time consuming and labor intensive; lasting all week. This was due to the fact that all who were providing support were insuring that the job was completely [correct] the first time.

The Unit Manning Roster (UMR) became a major problem prior to leaving home station. Many of our soldiers had been slotted in positions in which they were not qualified. These soldiers had to be re-slotted or shown as excess. Directions from FORSCOM, 5th Army, and HCS did not provide guidance as to how to deal with these excess personnel. Some of the medical residents (physicians in training), all our 91C students, and our R.O.T.C. SMPs were mobilized as per the guidance received. One medical resident and all the 91C students were later released from active duty while at Ft. Polk, LA.

Key personnel remained on active duty on 19 and 20 November 1990, and the unit was ordered to active duty on 21 November 1990 in accordance with Permanent Orders 147-43, dated 16 November 1990. As unit personnel reported to duty on 21 November 1990, packing and loading became the order of the day. Personnel were motivated and as tasks were completed it became apparent that the command would be able to let people go home for Thanksgiving before departing for Ft. Polk on 26 November 1990.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT MOB STATION

By SFC John O. Bondhus


Training for the 148th Evacuation Hospital started after arriving at Ft Polk, LA. The training was broken down into three phases under the direction of Devil Troop Brigade and Banes-Jones Army Hospital; both active component units stationed at Ft Polk, LA.

Phase 1 consisted of common task or soldier skills. Marksmanship training was required for the unit. 100% of our personnel qualified with the M-16 rifle or the M1191A1 45 cal pistol. All personnel were validated in NBC skills after passing a comprehensive test consisting of decontamination of skin and equipment, donning and wearing of the M17 protective mask, and the proper use of the M256 test kit. Rules of engagement, custom and culture and threat vehicle identification were also briefed, studied, and tested.

Phase 2 was under the control of Banes-Jones Army Hospital who was responsible for the training and evaluation of all medical personnel. This was accomplished through the use of board certification for medical pro-

professionals and visual observation of classes taught to enlisted personnel. Enlisted personnel were assessed by the OICs assigned to each hospital ward and the education and experience level of the personnel being assessed.

Phase 3 consisted of a collective Field Training Exercise. The exercise was conducted by Devil Troop Command and Banes-Jones Army Hospital. The exercise was written and conducted to exercise the hospital proper with the use of the 148th's MEET equipment (60 bed set-up). Support sections minus the supply section were exercised very little during the FTX. After a final analysis of our performance the unit was validated for deployment to the Middle East.



Spec. James S. Meyer, 148th Evacuation Hospital, Arkansas National Guard, is the son of Ron Meyer, former editor of the *Benton Courier*, who created this cartoon.

The First Ship Leaves

By SSG Bill Brown

We convoyed to Beaumont Texas from Ft. Polk. Then we sat around until the ship was loaded. I left with the first ship, Bud Wilkinson stayed another four to five days then he came on another ship. The name of my ship was Gulf Banker. We had

a super crew. All were real nice. Had super cargo, we had no duties just a boat and fire drill once a week. We had to check the cables and the turn buckles down in the holes once while we were stopped at Gibraltar. They were all pretty loose. We had been in rough waters in the Atlantic. There [were] swells 35 to 50 ft. We had rolls of 45 to 50 this was trying times. Everything was thrown around the ship. Dashes broke. We had a man to get thrown across the Gully hitting his back into the table leg (which was a steel pipe). He was hurt pretty bad. The Coast Guard flew him off ship. We took on a New Elite while on the move. Our sewer broke while in the rough waters. So we stayed at Gibraltar for two days while they fixed the pipes. I walked all over the rock of Gibraltar. It was real nice. After we left there we went to the Red Sea which was pretty, had a lot of gun points along it. The rest of the trip was pretty sun set and real pretty sun rises. The stars were just a clear as lights just sight by. The water would glow in the night it was real pretty. We were on ship for...twenty eight days. During which for...most of the time, we just ate and watched television. We did some small jobs just to help out. For me the ship ride has been the highlight of this trip. It was a chance in a lifetime for me. I'd still love to go back the same way. It was such fun.

THE MOVEMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA


By LTC Alvin L. Lievsay

After all actions were completed at Ft. Polk, the unit departed in six different increments. The advanced party, consisting of 5 personnel, left Ft. Polk on 27 December 1990 at 0600 hours for Charleston, South Carolina. They finally arrived at King Fahd International Airport at 1730 hours on 29 December 1990. The next group of 39 personnel departed England Air Force Base, Louisiana on 0900 hours, 30 December 1990; and arrived in Dahrhan, Saudi Arabia at 1205 hours on 31 December 1990. A third group of 100 and a fourth group of 234 departed on 30 December 1990 at 1100 hours and 1300 hours, respectively. The third and fourth groups landed at King Fahd International Airport at 1630 hours on 31 December 1990. A rear detachment of filler personnel were left at Ft. Polk under the direction of CPT Max D. Easter, the hospital S1. This group was 77 strong and finally joined the unit in two groups; arriving on 10 January 1991, and 27 January 1991.

FLIGHT OF THE 100

By LTC Jim Power

The flight 100 was the name given to the middle group of troops to leave Ft. Polk for Saudi Arabia. This included a mixture of officers and enlisted people. The advanced party had already left and a group left behind to gather up the fillers and loose ends.



Cover of booklet from Arkansas National Guard Museum Collection 2006.07.17.

We had to have everything packed in bag A and bag A according to instructions put out. There were also instructions left for packing the alic pack. These were all packed on trucks and carried to the plane to be loaded in cargo area. We were allowed to carry a laundry bag on the plane to include MRE's, personal hygiene items, needed for flight, etc. There was no definite time for departure of the busses from Ft. Polk to the airport established so everyone had to just sit around and wait. We also had to load with all our load bearing equipment, weapon if assigned, helmet, etc.

The busses arrived and we left on about a 2 hour trip to airport at Alexandria. There was no definite OIC communicated in charge but was no problem till later time. The departure date was 30 DEC 90. Once arriving at airport, we unloaded and formed up in a large hangar. We had to stand around for several hours. Seems like weather as warm and muggy at the time. Several ate their meals and snacks because hungry or bored. The wind was blowing rather hard.

We met up with the 216th Ambulance Co. There was some confusion over who would have the front of the plane and who would have the back. Since 148th had larger group, it was decided that the 148th would have the front. All this was being decided while the crew of the L1011 had gone to Alexandria to purchase food for the trip. They claimed that they did not know that there were no facilities for re-supplying the plane with food. So they went to town and bought enough junk food to include peanuts, rolls, etc., to call feeding us breakfast. There seemed to be this type of communication problems on most of the flight.

We finally were allowed to board the plane. LTC Power arranged for the officers of the 148th Evac to set

across the front with a seat in between each to keep their laundry bag. The enlisted set immediately behind. Then the 216th was in the back of the plane. Once every one was seated, it came up about smoking at which time the appointed OIC that was never communicated came to surface and advised there would be no smoking on the flight. This made a difference to some and not to others. Since the flight was so long, it was finally resolved that the smokers could go to the back and smoke. We took off for Granger, Newfoundland and landed in the night after a rather long flight, but the flight was comfortable with music on headsets, movies to watch, food and drink offered on regular basis. We landed in Granger and were allowed to get off the plane



Hospital Flag—Guidon—148th Evac Hospital—Desert Storm (Arkansas National Guard Museum Collection 2006.13.17)

and walk into the terminal. The time seemed to be in the evening. I remember the wind being real brisk and cold as we walked to the terminal. They had closed the airport just for us for security and safety reasons. The Canadian and airport security guards were all around to insure our safety. We were allowed about an hour to go to the bathroom, shop, have drinks, coffee, etc. They had stores to shop in. We were allowed to make phone calls to home. I remember a particular brand of ice cream that was great and the cokes had a good taste. I remember the bath

room paper was real small and unusual. All the airport staff people were extremely nice.

We were notified to board the plane which we did and took off again for Saragossa, Spain. This again was a long flight with many trying to sleep as much as possible. This time the food offered to us was much better and came on a regular basis. Movies, music, and reading material seemed to flow.

We arrived in Saragossa and were not allowed to get off the plane. This was in the early hours of the morning. Everyone was tired of being on the plane but no decision could be made to get off the plane or not. During the time of sitting on the plane and waiting was several hours. Apparently there was some mechanical difficulties. Also, they took on a new crew which seemed to be more friendly than the crew we had been flying with. They also discovered one of the laboratories was not working so that had to be fixed before we left. So after several hours, we were off again for another long flight. We did get to watch several good movies during all these flights. Again we were offered food and drink. That seemed to be an item they kept coming to us on a regular basis.

This seemed to be even longer flight. We finally landed in Saudi. We landed at [the] wrong airport. This airport was the Dhahran International Airport and after taxiing around for a little while, we took off again to land at King Fahd Airport. At this airport, we deplaned and got in formation, this was late afternoon with it being warm at first but as the sun went down, it began to get real cool. We also discovered that our baggage had been mixed in with the 216th and it took hours for it to get separated. We had to march to an area where there were several Saudi busses. Again, we waited to get everyone there with all the baggage. We also met up with another flight of our troops to wait to move out as a unit. We met up with the commander and all the normal command structure was back in tact.

The hours grew in to darkness and cold as we waited. Finally, everything was together and we moved out with the Saudi drivers moving at random and break neck speeds to an area called Khobar Towers (MGM Towers) [where] we would again have trouble getting there and also getting the proper baggage together. This was accomplished during the hours of night and at midnight, New Year's Eve, we were sorting baggage and moving into area to sleep for the night and to be in holding for a few days. So ended the flight of the 100.

LIFE AT KHOBAR

by LTC Thomas Jefferson

The question is, "Was there any life in Khobar?" The main body spent eleven days there; it served as our introduction to Saudi Arabia and even to international travel for many of us. It was less than glamorous.

[We] arrived at King Fahd International Airport the evening of 31 Dec 90. One aircraft had mistakenly landed at Dhahran Air Base first, but quickly caught up with us. On landing, all duffel bags were thrown randomly onto the tarmac in huge piles beside each aircraft. Bags of each unit were then sorted, more or less accurately. We quickly climbed aboard then and commenced to sit for 2 1/2 hours, cold, tired, hungry, and anxious. Finally, we were driven to our billets at the Al Kobar Housing Authority site, as "MGM Grand" We arrived minutes before midnight and celebrated New Year 1991 shouting people's names over and over, trying to sort out 750 duffel bags and zillions of rucksacks, sleeping bags, and laundry bags. By 0230, we had been assigned to a 5 room, 3 bath apartments, and 25 people in each. Furnishings were limited to thin blue carpet, obviously directly glued to the marble floors and just as hard. Sleeping 5 to a room, we spent the next 11 days developing rug rash on backs, knees, elbows, heels, and butts as we sat, slept, crawled, and flopped around on the firm floors.



Map showing Khobar and it's location in the Middle East. Map acquired from gecat.com.sa.

Plumbing was available, such as it was. Arky ingenuity was needed to provide power to the water heaters. Unlike many Saudi buildings, ours had real sit-down toilets instead of a hole in the bathroom floor. Toilet paper appeared optional, as it had to be discarded in the trash rather than flushed. Contract service provided breakfast and supper each day; lunch was MREs. We received our first supplies of bottled Saudi water, which actually tasted pretty good.

Transportation was not available. Our unit was issued one 40 passenger bus which was used all day to shuttle the critical staff to port and various other official places. Military bureaucracy had its finest hour as our people heard time after time that all the equipment we expected to receive in-country (as we had been assured at Ft. Polk) was not available. Concertina wire, ammunition, and many other items of importance to us simply could not be had. Units were

blatantly stealing items from each other. Guards had to be posted to protect unit assets. The whole mission was renamed "Operation Desert Steal".

Our housing area was a large complex of apartment buildings constructed a decade earlier to house some

Bedouin tribes. They apparently stayed only briefly. Then, declaring distaste for apartment dwelling, they returned to the desert. The buildings sat empty until our deployment. There were well over 10,000 American troops there, and more arriving daily. Our security was lax at first, but quickly improved to include concertina, blocked roads, lookouts on the roofs, and roving HUMMMVs with mounted M-60 machine guns. Nonetheless, we felt vulnerable; there were constant rumors about terrorist attacks, both there and at the port. The Great Saudi Bomb Scare [one] night, that emptied three apartment buildings, did nothing to ease people's minds (CSM Hattabaugh has documented this episode).

Rumors were constant, concrete information was nonexistent. Anxieties rose daily. Finally, we received orders to move to our TAA. The main body, most of it, departed on 11 Jan 91.

BOMB SCARE

By CSM Jerry Hattabaugh

When you are using the stairs, it is a long way to the ground from the 5th floor of Khobar Towers. Approximately 75 soldiers from the 148th Evac Hospital exited by those stairs swiftly and orderly to join the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st floors in a field just outside the building. It was 2230 hours on 4 January 1991. An unidentified person had entered the building with a rucksack and several minutes later the soldier left empty handed. Security, after having been alerted by the guard, decided that evacuating the building would be the safest approach.

It was cold that night and not only were there soldiers without shoes and pants, but I found that I had left without a shirt or jacket also. COL Nichols offered me his jacket as he walked out of the building. I readily accepted his kind offer. I realized that he may have been the last person to exit. He then moved the unit to an underground parking garage which was lighted and provided some wind break and security. We were quite amazed to see each other's wearing apparel or lack thereof. Due to the late hour and many being ready for bed, several of the female soldiers were in gowns.



Because of the rank on the Colonel's jacket, a young lieutenant approached me thinking I was a colonel instead of a CSM. He said, "Sir, I just want to reassure you that we are doing everything possible to clear up the matter." I replied, "Just be quick about it Lieutenant, my troops are getting cold in their BVDs and bare feet." He said, "Yes sir." saluted and left.

SSG Tom Stewart remembered that he and several others had left a large sum of money in his room and wanted to go back after it. We asked him which was more valuable, his money or his life. He was thinking very hard on that when the Lieutenant returned and gave the "all clear." At that point we all returned to our rooms. We later found out that the person who entered the building with the ruck sack was returning the item to a member of our unit who had lost it during the movement. That is why he left the building empty handed.

A SHOT IN THE DARK

By CSM Jerry Hattabaugh



*Khobar Tower, January 1991
(Photo from fikkr.com)*

On the evening of 9 January 1991 between 1930 and 2000 hours at Khobar Towers, everyone in the unit was relaxing, doing laundry, writing letters or preparing for the following day. Two members of the 1st AD were visiting with some of our troops as well. Suddenly, we heard a shot. Our two friends were part of the unit providing security for the compound. They responded immediately by ordering all lights out and telling us all to stay away from the windows. The word was passed from apartment to apartment and CPT Smith and CSM Hattabaugh were notified.

The two soldiers reported to their supervisors and then returned to our apartment on the third floor. They set up a "sniper-point" from our window and stayed in touch with their headquarters by radio. After about forty-five minutes an all clear was given. We all started to breath a bit easier; but were anxious to find out where the shot had come from and why it was fired.

Our two friends returned to their headquarters and then came back to us with the information they had obtained. It seems the shot had been fired as a warning to two Arabs that were carrying brown paper bags and entering the compound over the concertina wire. They had been ordered to halt and had not heeded to the order. The shot was called an "accidental discharge" to prevent an international incident.

Everyone was a bit shaken, but no one was injured. Thanks to the 1st AD and the 1st CAV for providing excellent security during our stay at Khobar Towers.

We didn't know if the Arabs were friend or foe, but it is believed that they were workers from the compound who had been grocery shopping. I believe it is better to be safe than sorry.

MAIN BODY MOVES TO TAA

By LTC Alvin L. Lievsay

After all the preparations had been made the unit assembled in Area G at Dammam Port. The unit had 33 military vehicles assigned to the 148th, 6 S&P trucks, and 3 Saudi Arabian buses. Two buses failed to make the last start time. The unit had delayed its departure from 1300 to 1800 hrs. due to the unavailability of transportation assets. The final delay, from 1700 to 1800, was caused by the late arrival of both the S&P trucks and the buses.

Finally, at 1800 all but two buses had arrived and the unit had to depart or risk staying all night in the vehicles and beginning the convoy request process all over again the next day. When it was realized that the two buses had the 1SG, Chief Nurse, and a guide who had been to the sight; it was decided to leave as scheduled.

When the [led] vehicle departed the front gate, it was like the start of the Indianapolis 500. The Saudi police were leading the convoy and the military vehicles had to keep up at all costs. Each vehicle had a strip map and each person had some MREs and bottled water. It looked like all would come in handy.

As the Saudi police lead this sand and green colored centipede through the vapor lighted highways of Dammam, the realization of just what we had gotten in to was becoming more and more apparent. Our ad-

vanced party had already arrived at the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) and the rest of the hospital, minus two buses, was now on the way to the area we would soon refer to as "home."

Since the 148th Evac only had one radio, the unit was part of a larger convoy. We had heard that once out of Dammam the convoys disintegrated and ours was no exception. Our trail vehicle, with the radio, had to become the lead vehicle and the guide, SSG Charles Taylor, had to become the eyes of the "centipede."

We followed our strip maps and refueled and refreshed at the "convoy support centers." At one of the centers we had our first taste of MOREs (meals operational ready to eat), but we did not know that at the time. It was simply Campbell's Soup and Hormel chilimac in individual servings. We had to drive all night and had only our strip maps, the traffic flow, and our guide on which to rely. As the sun peered over the horizon, we were able to see a most desolate area. The terrain was basically flat and the tallest structure in sight was the whip antenna on the HUMMV that was the lead vehicle of the convoy. Drivers and assistant drivers were becoming very tired and some required replacement for safety reasons. The unit continued to push on to our final destination.

The convoy had stayed intact during the entire night movement, which was something that other units had not been able to accomplish. As we arrived to the outskirts of Al Qaysumah we pulled off at a small gas station in order to regroup before crossing the release point at our TAA. As the vehicles pulled in we realized that the convoy was much smaller than when we left our last check point. Somehow, during the hours of daylight, some of the convoy had gotten separated. One vehicle was sent ahead to the TAA to get MAJ John Woodall, advanced party commander, to lead the convoy and another vehicle went back to look for the remainder of the convoy. All were found relatively quickly and arrived to the TAA safe and somewhat sound.

The convoy arrived to the TAA at 0730 and the personnel immediately unloaded and began to erect tents for sleeping. The temperature was in the 40s and the wind was blowing gently, as we would soon find out both could change rather quickly.

BUGOUT AT AL QAYSUMAH, SAUDI ARABIA

By COL David R. Nichols



*148th EVAC Nurses Quarters Painting
Artist Col (Ret) Homer J. Allbritton*

The 148th EVAC Hospital under the direction of the 332 Med BDE occupied a field site at Quaysumah airfield, Saudi Arabia during its initial deployment. The advance party occupied the site on 10 January, and established an initial perimeter, sleeping tents and hospital layout. On the morning of the 12th January, the main body arrived on site. During the day the hospital was being established with additional sleep tents, and the spotting of ISO and MIL VANS of the DEPMEDS equipment. Several officers from the 101 airborne Task Force in the immediate area came to us to inquire who we were, why we were here and who was our higher command. They further explained that they were assigned to the airfield by the 18th Corps out of KKMC in order to protect it as a possible site of Iraqi aggression. The 1st AD was also south of our position across Tapline road. Their

mission was to support the 101st as armor reserve, and they had plans to approach through our immediate vicinity. Because of the apparent conflict in the AOC, I sought some guidance from the BDE G3 as to the appropriateness of our being at the site. The area had been de-conflicted by our advance party commander,

MAJ Woodall, but things seemed to be changing by the minute. On the evening of the 12th the weather became the typical welcome of the 148th. It began to rain, and by morning many of the tents were filling with water, and the uncovered floors were turning to mud. When we looked outside at daylight it was clear the day was going to be exciting. The ground was full of puddles, and where vehicles or foot traffic was heavy, the previous firm ground became a mud soup, up to 6 inches or more in areas. It was cold in the 30's perhaps warming into the 50's. The rain continued with only brief respites. We continued to receive inquiry from the



Guidon Flag flown at the 12th EVAC Hospital

combat elements in the area. Late in the afternoon another trip was made to brigade to discuss our situation, and have as the very least a plan in mind for a retrograde escape if the situation appeared to warrant it. While at the BDE, VII Corps OPS called with an inquiry as to what was at the airfield from the BDE, and how long would it take to remove it? While the decision was being made regarding leaving the area with or without equipment the command element returned to the area. The BDE G3 then sent an FM message to our site which we heard on the vehicle FM: "Pack A, Pack B, be prepared to move out ASAP." end of message. With this message reaching the site and the already heightened concern of the hospital personnel, a wave of mild panic struck. When we had reached the area, soldiers were hurriedly packing and leaving much of their personnel gear behind. It was the evening of the 13th January 1991, the sky was overcast and the entire area was in a state of

blackout. One had a hard time seeing your hand in front of your face. The decision had been made to evacuate and had imprudently been sent over the FM radio without the benefit of a calm explanation. This I suppose had been decided by the G-3. A poor decision at the very least. The unit then was evacuated using all available organic vehicles and trucks from the 12th EVAC, and the 818th Med BN. Our people gathered personal equipment and belongings from their sleep tents and carried it with them to the waiting vehicles. Later we found people had left many items and lost others in the dark of night during the transfer. We were denied permission to leave a guard force in the area. I personally, with the CSM, went to the TASK Force commander, COL Perdon, and requested they try to keep an eye on the area for us, as we were denied the option of guards. This group was located at the neighboring airfield, a short trip across a muddy, dark desert. He explained the situation of an anticipated attack that very evening. Intelligence had come to the conclusion that the WAD1 AL BATIN would be the location of an Iraqi armor and infantry attack. He and LTC Franks had decided to move the units for safety. He also had obtained permission for large number of combat engineers to come into the area to build his defenses. After we left the area to join the unit at the 12th EVAC we wandered our way down Tapline road. It was so dark that everything looked strange and we could not see any of the units that were set back off the road. We passed the 12th site and soon realized it. We then turned around and awaited the arrival of the unit at the 12th Evac entrance.

The unit because of the extreme darkness had taken a long time to get all of the troops loaded and out of the area. LTC Lievsay and SFC Bondhus had remained to ensure all had left the site. As CSM Hattabaugh and I sat in our HMMV at the entrance of the 12th EVAC we watched the long caravan of vehicles wind its way up the desert from Tapline to the hospital berm. All traveled with their blackout lights. It seemed to take hours for this apparent simple task to be completed. When all reached the safety of the berm that night it had taken over 4 hours for the 400 people of the unit to move about 12 miles Southeast along Tapline road. That night all were grateful to find a dry bed and rest.

Upon return to the site the next day, we discovered that the area had been looted and ransacked. The sleep

tents were all trashed and had any personal items remaining scattered around the tents. As an accounting was made it was clear that many had lost personal items and that the organizational equipment had also suffered. Lost items are listed in the report of survey and the personal items are noted by the individual claims which are being filed. It is uncertain exactly who took the items as there were elements in the area from several units of the 101st airborne, and an engineer group and the Special Forces.

After the events mentioned above the unit left a guard force in place for the next six days, as it was instructed to remain with the 12th Evac and have day time details to establish the hospital.

LIFE AT THE 12TH EVAC

By Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry Wilcox

Arriving at 2230 hrs. in the rain and clinging mud the 148th Evac found the 12th Evac Minimal Care Wards to be inviting. By 2400 hrs. most soldiers were bedded down. However, [not] all were sleeping. Several troops were without dry uniforms, sleeping bag and blankets. A miserable night was the common experience.



Aerial view of the 12th Evacuation Hospital, Saudi Arabia. Photograph courtesy of Col. Mike McGuire.

In the [next] six days some of the clan had to move sleeping quarters three times. A bad situation was made tolerable by the helpful but strained hospital hospitality. The 12th Chaplain opened the chapel tent for additional sleeping space causing an altering of the normal schedule for religious services.

All survived the three hour, 13 mile ride. The "casualties" came from the half mile walk through the thick darkness and slick murky mud. Some witnesses tell of seeing soldiers, who otherwise were strike troops, dragging bags "A" and "B" in an unceremonious manner while speaking in an unknown tongue.

The 148th were very quickly assigned to the work details. All in all the situation was difficult at best. The work details added to the frustration.

The retreat was brought about by a threat from the Iraqi forces to plunge south toward our position. The troops were frightened and concerned for their safety. Some troops were afraid to make formation due to the tactical situation.

We had 148th people scattered throughout the 12th compound. Difficulty in accountability was increased by some troops not being able to "find their place".

On the night of the Presidential ultimatum to President Saddam. We were ordered into our MOPP gear at 0330 hrs.

The following are comments recorded at random from some of our troops about the stay at the 12th:

"Living out of a ruck sack for 6 days was trying."

"Horrendous"

"I remember saying to myself, 'I can go not one more step in this mud,' and some reached down and picked up my bag for me and then I was able to make it."

"My most vivid mental picture from being at the 12 Evac was watching Frank Ma use his home made broom to tidy up the tent."

"The announcement that movies would be shown for the 12th Personnel only."

"The 0430 Stand To was totally out of place."

"Why did we have to turn off the pot-bellied stoves before going to sleep?"

"My pain came when I learned that my make-up was in my bag at the bottom of a 5 ton."

"I knew that I was totally without control of my own life."

"Scarred that a SCUD attack would get us."

We survived, but the memory lingers on. Memory is a great place to visit, but not a very good place to live.

ESTABLISHING THE HOSPITAL AREA

By LTC Rae Lynn Tuck

LAYOUT PREPARATION

The hospital layout was decided upon at MOB station, after conferring with all sections of the hospital and looking at layouts of Evac Hospitals already in Saudi. This plan was based upon amount of TEMPER reported in the DEPMEDS fielding exercise at Camp Bullis and was changed based on the amount of TEMPER reported by the team returning from the POMCUS site.




Diagram of the 12th Evacuation Hospital in Saudi Arabia. (Source: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Narrative on 12th EVAC (Chapter 4). Oral histories of Col. Mike McGuire and others.)

Especially helpful in preparing the layout was a magnetic board (prepared by MAJ Ma) with magnet pieces cut to scale representing TEMPER, ISOs, MILVANS, generators, vestibules, etc.

After completion of the original plan on the magnetic board, it was drawn to scale. During the Christmas "break", the plan was entered into a computer by one of the unit members to produce a large copy of the layout (to scale). This was to be used with over prints to allow the placement of generators, commo lines and water/waste lines.

After visiting established Evacs in Saudi, it was decided to consolidate wards to provide more staffing than the skeleton amount allowed by MTOE and to allocate 2 TEMPERS to the EMT area.

The layout provided for administrative areas (HOC, Nurs. Service Control, Prof. Services) to be under TEMPER. This was a deviation from DEPMEDS doctrine, but decided upon because of convenience and climate in the theater.

The layout provided for resupply to be conducted internally if needed based on the possibility of sand storms as reported by established hospitals in Theater. This was also a deviation from DEPMEDS doctrine which call for external resupply.

PHYSICAL ESTABLISHMENT

January 12, 1991. DEPMEDS fielding team dropped ISOs. POMCUS equipment left for us does not give us ability to move ISOs if there is an error. (No crane or dolly sets.)

January 13, 1991. The 148th has arrived-proven by the fact that it is raining without letup. We have a deadline and have proven ourselves capable in the past of meeting deadlines. This time we have even greater challenges—Rain, mud, no engineer support, a hospital not packed functionally like the newer ones are, and no ISO: ISO or ISO: TEMPER connectors.

We realize as we progress that we must have MILVANS packed by the IRAQI'S themselves. Is it part of Saddam's plan that the labels on the canvas are not consistent and there is no legend for the labeling? Did he plan for the keys to the MILVANS to be locked inside 1 of the 37 MILVANS with no clue as to which one?

The establishment of the hospital is interrupted by the movement of the unit to the 12th for approximately a week. During this time the canvas intended to make connectors is "borrowed".

January 18, 1991. Work resumes after returning from the "bugout". The ruts left from the vehicles participating in the "bugout" make establishment more of a challenge. Where are the engineers promised in DEPMEDS doctrine?

Also a challenge is the mud (i.e.-paste created by the rain and "sand"). A HUMMV with a ski team trailing behind it becomes a familiar and coveted detail as we try to level the ruts and dry the paste.

January 24, 1991. EMT functional. 12 beds. Our shingle is out!

January 27, 1991. ICU 1 and 2 functional. 36 total beds.

January 28, 1991. 96 beds. We've met our goal!

Changes are incorporated into the original layout based on the input from the utilities OIC. Since he was a "filler" we did not have his input earlier. Other changes incorporated based on "requirements" of specific areas. Why weren't these noted earlier when copies of the layout were distributed?

January 29, 1991. Water/waste distribution system started. We are the recipients because we are declared functional before our bum berm neighbors.

February 2, 1991. 408 beds were now available for the 7th CORPS, Southern hospitality included.

CONDUCTING HOSPITAL OPERATIONS—S1 ACTIVITIES

By CPT Max D. Easter

During the hospital operations, the Administration Section discovered there was a lot of difference between the way the National Guard conducted business and the way the Regular Army conducted business. The main problem was that the Regular Army didn't know what the Regular Army was doing.

Reports changed on a weekly basis, sometimes on a daily basis. Task Force Evac would change the way we did a report and then the 332nd Med Bde would call and tell us that we had done it wrong. They would say it was right the first time. The Bde G-1 would call to request information, we would ask if they had sent it through Task Force Evac and they would tell us that they were going to skip TF because they couldn't get it right.

While at Ft. Polk we were told that we would be able to get SSSC items while in Saudi Arabia but upon arrival we discovered that there was no way to get more typewriter ribbons, correction tape, or printer ribbons for our typewriters and computers. This became a real problem once we began to process 400 Awards and 300 OER/NCOERs. The typewriters themselves became a problem because of the blowing sand and dust. The ones that continued to work were not the expensive Panasonic Word Processors but the much simpler IBM and Swintec typewriters. These typewriters were not effected as much by the continual bombardment of dirt.

The Hospital, the short it was in operation, work smoothly. The problem for the Administrative section was that it was not in operation very long. The problems this caused were just as the ADMIN Section was getting accustomed to the Regular Army way of changing things, the Hospital closed then there were all the Awards, OERs, and NCOERs that had to be done. There never was a break in the immense pile of paper work. Though the ADMIN Section was use to the work, it was hard to keep moral up when they worked long hours and their counterparts in the hospital were off for several days at a time. This was finally corrected when we went to the 1/2 day workday.

THE COMBAT PATCH

By LTC Alvin L. Lievsay

The personnel assigned to the 148th Evacuation Hospital during Operation Desert Shield/Storm won the right to wear a combat patch on their right arm. The authorized patch is that of the 332nd Medical Brigade from Tennessee. The following is the description and symbolism of the patch:



DESCRIPTION

On a blue field edged white within a 1/8 inch maroon border, 2 inches in width and 3 inches in overall height, semicircular with five-pointed stars above a white-edged scarlet cross issuant from with lateral arms throughout.


SYMBOLISM

The white stars on a blue field to the state flag of Tennessee, the unit's home area. The scarlet cross is symbolic of medical care and the colors white and maroon are traditionally associated with the Army Medical Department. The outer shape is symbolic of medicine and surgery; the rounded top suggesting a capsule of medicine and the pointed bottom the edge of a scalpel.



"TEXAS A&M, UT MED..WOULDN'T YOU JUST KNOW IT, MAJOR?
A FINE OFFICER/DOCTOR LIKE THIS COULD ONLY COME FROM
SUCH PRESTIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS."

A few more comics
from Ron Meyer,
former editor of the
Benton Courier



"LOTS OF TRAFFIC, PLENTY OF GUNS, THE SMELL OF CORDITE,
EATING ON THE RUN... SORT OF REMINDS YOU OF CRUISIN'
GEYER SPRINGS."

Arkansas Units Mobilized For Operation

Desert Shield/Storm

Compiled by SSG Nathan Barlow



ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Unit: 296th Medical Company

Commander: Captain Steven Self

Mission: To provide ground ambulance support for 5th Infantry

Divisions at Fort Polk

Size: 100

Home Base: Charleston

Status: Sent to Ft. Polk, LA for stateside duty

Activation Date: November 16, 1990

Deployment Date: Not Deployed

Additional Information: Returned home in July 1991.

Unit: 216th Medical Company

Commander: Captain Randall Carey

Mission: To provide ground evacuation of patients

Size: 100

Home Base: Lake Village

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: November 17, 1990

Deployment Date: December 30, 1990

Additional Information: Returned home in November 1991.

Unit: 224th Maintenance Company

Commander: Captain Russell McFarland

Mission: To occupy unit areas and attain operational readiness

Size: 280


Home Base: Mountain Home, Marshall, and Russellville

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: November 21, 1990

Deployment Date: January 12, 1991

Additional Information: Returned home May 23, 1991 from Saudi Arabia.



Unit: 1122nd Transportation Company

Commander: Captain Reginald Smith

Mission: To deliver cargo and personnel on 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks and semi-trailers

Size: 140

Home Base: Monticello

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: September 20, 1990

Deployment Date: November 1, 1990

Additional Information: Returned from Saudi

TROOP COMMAND
ARKANSAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
CAMP ROBINSON
NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72118-2200

SOTI

4 SEP 91

I T I N E R A R Y
216TH Medical Company Welcome Home

5 SEP 91 Aircraft arrives Little Rock Airport (37 PAX)
TIME TBD Civilian passengers Deplane

BG Chambers aircraft for Welcome Home comments
via intercom

LTC Wofford provides administrative comments via
intercom

Soldiers deplane and sign out (table provided at
front of ramp prior to reaching terminal gate) The
FT Polk representative is MAJ DeJusus, Info sheet
will be provide-TRP CMD

Soldiers greeted by family members and public

Soldiers secure baggage at carousel

Depart for Home of Record (Bus provided)

9 SEP 91
0630 *Mandatory formation at Lake Village Armory for
all returnees

0600 Depart for FT Polk (POV or Bus, if necessary)

NLT 1300 All personnel Report to Bldg 7178, FT Polk to begin
out processing

* IT'S IMPERATIVE THAT EVERYONE SHOWS UP FOR THE MANDATORY
FORMATION TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ACCOUNTABILITY.

AS OF 1000HRS 5 SEP 91 DELTA FLIGHT 731 ARRIVES AT 1935 HRS

Arabia on June 1, 1991

Unit: Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
217th Maintenance Company

Commanders: LTC Richard Haley

Captain Jay Stout

Mission: To provide administration for maintenance companies

Size: 63


Home Base: Russellville

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: November 29, 1990

Deployment Date: December 27, 1990

Additional Information: Returned from Saudi Arabia May 14, 1991.



Spc. Kerry Davie, 142 Field Artillery, Arkansas National Guard clears an Iraqi bunker in Kuwait (Photo by Sgt. Maj. Tom Magness).

Additional Information: On July 3, 1991, the brigade was officially released from active duty and returned to Arkansas National Guard Status.

Unit: 148th Evacuation Hospital Commanders:
COL David Nichols

Captain Danny Smith

Mission: To provide hospitalization for all classes of patients
Size: 415

Home Base: North Little Rock

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: November 21, 1990

Deployment Date: December 29, 1991

Additional Information: Returned May 4, 1991 from Saudi Arabia.

Unit: 204th Medical Detachment

Commander: LTC Herman E. Hurd

Mission: To provide dental support

Size: 80

Home Base: Little Rock

Status: Sent to Germany

Activation Date: December 9, 1990



Michael D. Pope/Special to the Gazette

CONFIDENCE: Sgt. Kenneth Holder of Bentonville, Ark., gives a thumbs-up to the crowd Saturday at Fort Sill, Okla., as the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade prepares to go to the Middle East.

Unit: 142nd Field Artillery Brigade

Commander: COL Charles Linch

Mission: To provide Field Artillery Fire Support to Combat Units

Size: 1,085

Home Base: Fayetteville and other NW Arkansas Cities

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: November 21, 1990

Deployment Date: January 14, 1991

Deployment Date: December 21, 1990

Additional Information: Returned from Germany to Fort Polk, La. And returned home in small groups.



*Tracy Sickles of Springdale, Ark., holds on to Pfc. Tony King Saturday at Fort Sill, Okla., before he heads to the gulf.
(Source: Arkansas Gazette, Sunday, January 20, 1991)*

Unit: 212th Signal Battalion

Commander: LTC Steve Rucker

Mission: To provide portion of corps area mobile subscriber equipment communication system

Size: 720

Home Base: North Little Rock

Status: Sent to Fort Hood, Texas

Activation Date: January 25, 1990

Deployment Date: Not Deployed

Additional Information: Returned from Fort Hood on March 23, 1994.

Unit: 25th Rear Area Operations Center

Commander: LTC Ronald S. Chastain

Mission: To provide rear area security and damage control

Size: 100

Home Base: North Little Rock

Status: Sent to Saudi Arabia

Activation Date: December 6, 1990

Deployment Date: January 14, 1991

Additional Information: Arrived at Home station on June 4, 1991.

Unit: 119th Personal Service Company

Commander: Captain Earnest Tate

Mission: To provide Administrative support to other units

Size: 50

Home Base: North Little Rock

Status: Sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Activation Date: January 22, 1991

Deployment Date: Not Deployed

Additional Information: Returned in small groups starting May 1991.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Unit: 188th Tactical Clinic

Commander: Col David H. Cope

Mission: To provide direct medical support and training to all organizations and personnel

Size: 65

Home Base: Fort Smith

Status: Sent to Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C. for state-side duty

Activation Date: January 16, 1991

Deployment Date: Not Deployed

Additional Information:



188th Tactical Fighter Group

Unit: 188th Civil Engineer Squadron
Commander: Col Steve Core
Mission: Firefighting
Size: 12
Home Base: Fort Smith
Status: Stateside Duty
Activation Date: March 24, 1991
Deployment Date: Not Deployed
Additional Information: Released mid-July 1991.

Unit: 188th Security Flight
Commander: LtCol Buddy Acoach
Mission:
Size: 17
Home Base: Fort Smith
Status: Mobilized for service at Fort Smith
Activation Date: February 7, 1991
Deployment Date: Not Deployed



189th Tactical Airlift Group


Unit: 189th USAF Clinic
Commander: Col James C. Kizziar
Mission: To provide medical support at the Clinic
Size: 28
Home Base: LRAFB
Status: Mobilized to serve at Nocton Hall, UK and Travis AFB, California
Activation Date: January 25, 1991

Deployment Date: Not deployed
Additional Information: Returned at various dates as individuals.

Unit: 189th Civil Engineering Squadron
Commander: Maj Jerry E. Rogers
Mission:
Size: 50
Home Base: LRAFB
Status: Mobilized for service at LRAFB
Activation Date: February 10, 1991
Deployment Date: Not Deployed

Unit: 189th Mobile Aerial Port Flight
Commander: Maj Paul R. Rasmussen
Mission:
Size: 12
Home Base: LRAFB
Status: Mobilized for service in the United Kingdom
Activation Date: February 12, 1991

Unit: 189th Resource Management Squadron
Commander: LtCol David Hipp
Mission: Served at Kirkland AFB, Albuquerque, NM
Size: 2
Home Base: LRAFB
Activation Date: February 19, 1991



WELCOMING HOME OUR ARKANSAS SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN


Nearly 3,000 soldiers and airmen of the Arkansas National Guard were activated in support of Operation Desert Storm. This represented 34 percent of the total assigned strength. Of special note, the 142 Field Artillery Brigade was highly praised before the House Armed Services Committee by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. This was in addition to similar accolades from the field by the British commander of the 4th Armed Brigade.

Arkansas' three-mile long welcome home parade was the longest in the nation, and was attended by entertainer Bob Hope, signer Marie Osmond and Miss America Marjorie Vincent.

Strength: ARNG Assigned 9,654; ANG Assigned 2,226; Federal Budget \$117,686,000.

Source: "On Guard, Desert Storm Special," December 1991.

Up to 200,000 pack 3-mile parade route



ON PARADE — Thousands of troops march up Capitol Avenue toward the state Capitol during Saturday's "Operation Welcome Home" parade for veterans of

Operation Desert Storm. About 200,000 spectators are estimated to have lined the parade route in Little Rock and North Little Rock.

Hope show draws 25,000, raises \$45,000 for hospital

BY JAKE SANDLIN
Democrat Staff Writer

Saluting Arkansas' military men and women in rousing red-white-and-blue fashion, up to 200,000 people lined a three-mile parade route Saturday to pay tribute to Operation Desert Storm personnel and veterans of other wars.

• More Operation Welcome Home 1B, 2B, 5B

The nightcap for the state's celebration was a star-studded

Parade-goers brave heat, wave flags

BY JAKE SANDLIN
Democrat Staff Writer

Whether it was because of family, friends, patriotism or just the lure of a huge parade, Arkansas' "Operation Wel-



JoEllen Black/Gazette Staff

FOR WHOM BELL TOLLS: Airman Michael Volt waves flag as he rides float up Capitol.



Source: Arkansas Gazette
July 7, 1991 from the Arkansas
National Guard Museum
Collection 2015.76

Maj Gen RA Smith OBE QGM



1st Armoured Division
British Forces Post Office 649

Colonel Charles J Linch
Commander 142nd Field Artillery Brigade

9 March 1991.

Dear Colonel Linch,

It is with great pleasure that I write to you to express my sincere thanks and admiration for you, your staff and all members of the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade. Your support to 1st (UK) Armoured Division after passing through the breach on Operation DESERT SABER was always impressive. In particular your timely and accurate fire supporting 4th Armoured Brigade as it fought through its objectives contributed significantly to the lightness of our casualties and to the swift and crushing victory. Commander 4th Armoured Brigade commented himself on the destructive effect of the fire from your guns and launchers.


This performance is all the more impressive since it seems to us that 142nd Field Artillery Brigade was given very little time to train after the guns were ashore before being thrown into battle; you and your soldiers seemed to take these difficulties in your stride and I quickly came to regard 142nd as an integral, dependable and significant addition to my own Divisional Artillery.

For the 1st (UK) Armoured Division it has been a singular honour to have had the support of your Brigade in Iraq and Kuwait during this Operation and I ask that you pass our very grateful thanks on to your men. You should all be justifiably proud of the part that you have played in this swift and decisive victory.

Yours sincerely

Rupert Smith

★ **BOB HOPE** ★



★ **MARJORIE VINCENT** ★



CELEBRITIES COME TO
LITTLE ROCK TO
CELEBRATE OUR TROOPS'
RETURN WITH A PARADE
AND PATRIOTIC
EXTRAVAGANZA.



★ **MARIE OSMOND** ★

WELCOME HOME:

Comedian Bob Hope headlines celebration at War Memorial Stadium.

PAGE

4

Your guide to the city-spanning parade, including route map and "survival tips."

PAGE

10

DESERT STORM:

What life was like in the Gulf for the Arkansans who served there.

PAGE

42

Homefront focus: How the town of Marshall coped with crisis.

PAGE

56

Featured Artifact: Howitzer, Self-Propelled, M110A2

By MAJ Matthew W. Anderson

2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery in Operation Desert Storm conducting convoy movement

To understand the development of the M110A2 you must go back to the 1950's when the U.S. Army was using the M53 (155mm) and the M55 (8 inch) Self-Propelled Howitzer. Both of these howitzers were 44 metric ton vehicles with gasoline powered engines. The army was moving away from gasoline to diesel to standardize the force and to reduce the explosive hazard. Additionally, the army wanted lighter vehicles that could be air transportable. Pacific Car and Foundry using the M578 Light Recovery Vehicle chassis developed two prototypes in 1959 the T235 (175mm) and the T236 (8 inch) which were accepted into army service as the M107 (175mm) in 1962 and the M110 (8 inch) in 1963. In addition to Pacific Car and Foundry, FMC Corporation

and Bowen-McLaughlin-York also manufactured the M107 and M110. The M107 and M110 were both used in the Vietnam War where artillery units found the M107 to have longer range but the M110 was more accurate. M107s were retired from service in the late 1970's with many of them converted to M110A2s. M110s were also modified starting in 1971 replacing the original M115 (aka M2A2 as WWII designation) armament (no muzzle break) with the M201 making it the M110A1 and later starting in 1978 installing the M201A1 armament making it the M110A2. The variants can be distinguished by having a single muzzle break for the M110A1



2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery in Operation Desert Storm conducting a fire mission.

and double muzzle break for the M110A2.

The M110A2 was crewed by thirteen personnel. A Howitzer Driver, Chief of Section, a Gunner, an Assistant Gunner and a Cannoneer rode on the howitzer while a Section Driver, an Ammunition Team Chief and five Cannoneers travelled in an M548 Tracked Weapons Carrier. The M110A2 weighed 28.3 metric tons (62,500



Gun 1, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery in Operation Desert Storm. Crew Members SSG Robert Sampley, Jackie Hickey, Stanley Henson, JR Rankin, Earl Duty

lbs). The lighter weight resulted in only the driver being lightly protected with a 13mm armor plate. The M110A2 was powered by a Detroit Diesel GMC series 8V71T, 8-cylinder, V-type turbocharged two cycle diesel with fuel injectors and overhead exhaust valves, 405 horsepower, had a speed of 54.7 km (30 mph) and a range of 523 km (325 miles). When in

action the gun crew fired a sustained rate of fire of one round per two minutes with a range of 25,000 meters for standard rounds and 30,000 meters with rocket assisted projectiles. The projectile on average weighed 203 lbs and left the barrel at a velocity of 2,300 fps. Only two rounds were carried on the M110A2 with the rest carried in the M548 that followed. The gun could elevate -2 to +65 degrees and could traverse 60 degrees. Ammunition approved for use was Agent M426, HE M404 (ICM), HE M106, HE M509A1 (ICM), HERA M650.

M110A2s went on to serve in Desert Storm with 5th Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, Romeo Battery, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines, the British Army and the Arkansas Army National Guard 142nd Field Artillery. Most other field artillery units had already transitioned to the M109 prior to Desert Storm. Interestingly, two of the old barrels from M110s also served in Desert Storm as the outer casing of GBU-28 Bunker Buster bombs dropped by two F-111Fs on an underground Iraqi Command Center in Taji. The M110A2 was retired from service in the mid 1990's. 155mm howitzers had increased in range and required less manpower and resources which effectively closed the gap between 155mm and rocket artillery that the 8 inch gun had filled.


References

TM 9-2350-304-10 Operator's Manual Howitzer, Heavy, Self-Propelled, 8 Inch, M110A2, Washington D.C. 27 April 1990



M110A2 formerly belonging to 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery on display at the Arkansas Guard Museum, Camp Robinson Arkansas

M110A2 formerly belonging to 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery on display at the Front Gate to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas



M110A2 formerly belonging to 2nd Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery on display at the Armed Forces Readiness Center, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

FEATURED PHOTO



"This photo of Captain Keith Klemmer was taken on March 2, 1991 in northern Kuwait. Captain Klemmer had just returned from his assignment with the British 1st Armoured Division Artillery back to HHB, 2-142nd Field Artillery. The photo was taken around 1300 in the afternoon and depict the oil well fires set by the retreating Iraqi Army. Captain Klemmer went on to command the 1-206th Field Artillery and the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade before being promoted to Brigadier General in May 2013."

Arkansas Military History Journal
A Publication of the
Arkansas National Guard Museum, Inc.

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