



WALTHALL

P.O. Box 89
Chesterfield, VA 23832
February 17, 1976

Mr. George Jernigan
Secretary of State
State of Arkansas
Little Rock, AR 72200

Dear Mr. Jernigan:

Upon the suggestion of Mr. Robert S. McCord (See copies of enclosed letters), respectfully request that you present a copy of my book entitled "WE CAN'T ALL BE HEROES", to the 153rd (First Arkansas). (Under separate cover)

This unit is one of fifty infantry regiments included in this little known segment of World War II history. Though 30 years late it is timely as no prior recognition has been given to the separate infantry regiments during that global war.

The book was printed by a subsidy publisher by the author and the only hope of breaking even on the printing cost is to sell over 800 copies of the book to interested personnel. Over the past ten months have been able to sell 400, mostly by attending reunions and speaking to veterans organizations. Many separate regiment associations have cooperated in the sales, and advertised the books availability to their members. Am enclosing extra brochures in the event any of the 153rd veterans are interested in personal copies.

Also enclosed is a copy of my work to date on the sequel to this book entitled "ORANGE FOUR", the 1942 US Victory in the Philippines. Hope the 153rd veterans don't mind moving from cold Alaska to warm Manila for their WWII service.

We had 17,000 ground forces troops in the Philippines, where war was expected, and over one million and a half men in the U.S. where war was not likely. My story should have been the true history of our effort in the Pacific.

Would appreciate a copy of any announcement made about this presentation.

Sincerely,
Melvin Curtis Walthall

Arkansas Democrat


February 13, 1976

Mr. Melvin C. Walthall
P. O. Box 89
Chesterfield, VA 23832

Dear Mr. Walthall:

Thanks for your letter. Let me suggest you send your book to our new Secretary of State, George Jernigan, who is very good at presentations of this kind and enjoys doing it.

Regards,



Robert S. McCord
Executive Editor

RSMcC/ln

P.O. Box 89
Chesterfield, VA 23832
February 8, 1976

Mr. Robert S. McCord,
Executive Editor,
The Arkansas Democrat
Little Rock, AR 72200

Dear Mr. McCord:

You people from the great state of Arkansas get in and out of Richmond before I have a chance to see you. A few months ago the Governor was here but I found out about it only after he had departed.

I have been trying to find a native of the state to carry a copy of my book "WE CAN'T ALL BE HEROES", A history of the Separate Infantry Regiments in WWII, back to Little Rock and present it to the 153d Infantry (First Arkansas), which has a chapter in the book.

This is the first publication to cover this little known segment of WWII, and I am sure the unit would appreciate a copy for their historical files. (See attached brochure).

The Richmond Times Dispatch in an article by Thomas R. Morris this date did carry the story of your speech at VCU. They also listed your newspaper where it is possible for me to at least contact you.

Would you be my emissary and accept a copy of the book through the mail for the appropriate presentation to the 153d?

I am a displaced Texan living in Virginia, the home state of the Walthall clan, and also close enough to the national archives for research trips. In addition to the book mentioned above I am also the author of "LIGHTNING FORWARD", the 34-year history of the 25th Infantry Division during the last three wars. As the association historian will present the manuscript to them at the division reunion in San Francisco this July for publication. Had a small part in writing "THE WALTHALL STORY", by Malcolm Elmore Walthall. My current project is "ORANGE FOUR", the 1942 US Victory in the Philippines. We had 17,000 ground troops in the Philippines and over one million in the US. In this book 12 of these separate regiments get to the Islands in November 1941 and defeat the Japanese invasion.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Melvin E. Walthall

FOREWORD

Our greatest defeat in World War II was not Pearl Harbor-- But the Philippines. Recovery from Pearl Harbor was measured in months, while regaining the Philippines was measured in years and thousands of casualties.

Though some may consider this book a work of fiction--actually it is mostly fact. A proper order of priorities; More manpower and materiel; A little more daring and it might have been possible to blunt the early Japanese attacks. Denied these quick victories, their aggressive wave might have receded with the tide. At the least, the Pacific War would have been more in our favor.

Much was done by General's Grunert and MacArthur to warn the War Department of the approaching peril, requesting always for higher priorities. Granted--so were other commanders in Hawaii, Panama and Alaska. In addition there was Lend-Lease, and supplies for our allies. History has recorded that the Philippines were not at the head of the priority list. A decision was finally made to elevate them to priority one--But this was late in 1941. Too late.

Even as late as 1941 the U.S. public was strongly isolationist and thought only of defending the Western Hemisphere. There were the new bases offered by Britain; A new responsibility to garrison Iceland; The government feared that Hitler would move into Spain and Portugal, and had plans to send a task force to capture the Azores; There were plans to send army troops to protect our airbase at Natal, Brazil as this was vital to our needs to ferry planes to Cairo. These matters helped to pull attention away from the peril about to descend on the Philippines.

Admiral Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, was so enthused over the increasing strength of the Far East Air Force (Some units had arrived and more were on the way) that he recommended to Washington his mission be changed from withdrawing southward from the Philippines to staying and fighting it out in Philippine waters.

General Brereton, who arrived in Manila in ~~early~~^{LATE} 1941 to organize the Far East Air Force, had a plan to bomb Formosa but was restrained by higher headquarters from pulling off this master stroke. He intended also to base half his bomber force at Del Monte Field in Mindanao but the field was not completed in time. Had he been able to carry out his plans, the Far East Air Force may have survived destruction.

All the lucky breaks went to the enemy because he was the more daring. Some of those breaks could have been in our favor.

This book hedges on fact only enough to show what could have happened with a little more aggressive action on the part of the War Department and US commanders. The largest bit of fiction involved is the word if.

Lt. Gen. George Grunert tried the hardest to bring about the victory that might have been, but he was relieved as Philippine Department Commander on MacArthur's recommendation. "It would be advantageous to relieve him, as I am loath, as long as he is here, to contract the functions of the department commander". The War Department recalled Grunert to the states and appointed MacArthur in his stead, which post he assumed on October 31, 1941 while retaining his USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) command. I will not comment further as I served under both these generals. Grunert in 1943-44 and MacArthur 1950-51. This book will not malign General Mac's fame, though it does delete the need for his famous " I Shall Return" statement. It allows him to stay and fight for the survival of his beloved Philippines, which after all was his primary goal.

General Grunert was assigned as Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command after Pearl Harbor and commanded four of the separate infantry regiments mentioned in "ORANGE FOUR"; the 113th (First New Jersey); 144th (Fourth Texas); 176th (First Virginia) and the 181st (Sixth Massachusetts). I am sure he would have preferred their fate to be as I describe them.

The separate infantry regiments "plucked" from the pages of my book "WE CAN'T ALL BE HEROES", were as trained as other regiments that would face combat by the time of the Louisiana Maneuvers and would have made tenacious defenders of the Philippines. To our eternal shame none of these I mention were used offensively in World War II. I have met many veterans of these regiments over the past few years and I am convinced they would have performed the deeds as accredited.

I do not advocate aggressively seeking another war but I hope if battle is thrust upon us, that our civilian and military leaders will not let victory slip from our grasp because of timid action. In other words, as they say about ex-president Harry Truman, we should give our enemies all the hell at our disposal.

Major (ret) MELVIN CURTIS WALTHALL
Chester, Virginia
November 27, 1975

Melvin C. Walthall
(Major, ret.)
P.O. Box 89
Chesterfield, VA 23832

ORANGE FOUR

The 1942 US Victory in the Philippines

"This orange plan is a lemon", yelled Major General George Grunert, recently arrived commander of the Philippine Department. This May day in 1940 he told his staff "Retreat to Bataan, hell-- we'll defend these islands with every means at our disposal. Now take this lemon and make me a true orange." His staff officers scurried down the hallway from his wrath but eager to start work on a real defense plan for the Philippine Islands.

General Grunert was talking about the US plans in event of war with Japan, codenamed War Plans Orange, third revision. It was originally named Plan Yellow but was changed for obvious reasons. Orange called for the navy to withdraw southward from the Philippines until the Pacific Fleet could advance westward and make coordinated offensive operations possible. The small army force was to delay any Japanese landing on Luzon, withdrawing to Bataan and Corregidor to deny entrance to Manila harbor to the enemy until reinforcements could arrive.

Had it not been for General Grunert's offensive spirit, which also jarred the War Department into action, the US might have suffered a humiliating defeat in the Philippines in 1942.

War Plans Orange, fourth revision, took many tough months to complete and overcame great obstacles of manpower, materiel, shortage of transportation and general indifference in the United States.

General Douglas Macarthur, Field Marshal in the Philippine Army and chief advisor to President Manuel Quezon, had been looking for a Philippine Department Commander who would press for the enlargement of that command in personnel and materiel. Able, decisive, and impatient General Grunert was just the man. In the coming months he and Macarthur would function like a double-barreled shotgun, bombarding the War Department with the defensive needs of the Philippines. The two men conferred frequently and, because of their deep mutual esteem born in World War One, made the amalgamation of the American and Philippine military establishments much smoother when that action became necessary in Mid-1941.

As late as mid-1940 General Grunert complained that his command had enough ammunition for "Only about three or four days fire per weapon".

In 1938 the War Plans Division, as reported by General Krueger to General Malin Craig, the Army Chief of Staff: "It is highly improbable, as matters now stand, that expeditionary forces will be sent to the Philippines in the early stages of an orange war".

The failure to strengthen the Far East outpost was due partly to the higher priority then accorded Hawaii and Panama.

Within a month after he became commander of the Philippine Department, Grunert was bombarding the War Department with requests and warning reports--in fact eight such communications during his first two months in the position.

In September 1940, General Grunert told General Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, that defeatism was evident among the Filipinos

because of the United States lack of announced policy backed by visual evidence of defense means and measures. In fact President Quezon told a large audience assembled at Rizal Stadium in Manila on the anniversary of the Commonwealth's founding, "The Philippines could not be defended even if every last Filipino were armed with modern weapons".

Against this pessimism Grunert's continuing requests for more troops and equipment delighted Macarthur, but brought only halting response from the War Department at first.

A joint army and navy board recommended a major increase in military and naval aviation strength in the Philippines, which prompted a new study by the army's War Plans Division as to the feasibility of trying to build an adequate defense system there. They reported to General Marshall that a proper military defense of the Islands would require twelve times the number of army aircraft then stationed there. Double the current strength of regulars and scouts and over 22 million in new construction, particularly airfields. Only then could the Philippine Department present "a serious deterrent to any overt act" of aggression.

Increased concern over Japanese expansion, Grunert's alarming reports from Manila, and congressional approval of large increases in military manpower and munitions--all of these developments of the last half of 1940 seemed to call for a change in policy regarding defense of the Philippines.

Shortly after Christmas the Philippine Department was notified that the strength of the Philippine Scouts would be doubled to 12,000, the 31st Infantry Regiment was to be enlarged by over 600 soldiers, additional coast and field artillery plus anti-aircraft batteries

would be shipped and \$1,250.00 would be allotted for construction, mainly at air bases.

This was a step in the right direction and in the spring of 1941 General Grunert was authorized a war garrison of 50,000 men. The persistent general notified the WPD that this was a nice initial increase but he would need many more than the 50,000 men to man the ramparts.

A Texas A&M graduate, on active duty only a few months, came to the general with a plan that might answer his manpower needs. The triangulation of the US Divisions were making available many separate infantry regiments and battalions of artillery, engineers, medical, quartermaster and other types of units. These units could be shipped to the Philippines without tearing down combat strength of the state-side divisions.

War Department planners presented many reasons why these troops could not be shipped; In the event of war they would be needed to man the coastal defense of the US; they might be integrated into newly forming divisions etc. But the bold logic of General Grunert's plan finally convinced General Marshall of its merit and he turned loose the floodgates of expeditious shipment of men and equipment. (That which could not be done--was done).

So began the journey of the many separate infantry regiments and their attachments called Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), fated for an epic battle that would halt the expansion of the rising sun and cause a dark cloud on their horizon.

Recently schooled logistic and transportation officers were dispatched to several ports to expedite this large shipment of men and materiel.

The 138th Infantry (First Missouri) and the 144th Infantry (Fourth

Texas) boarded transports at New Orleans.

The 176th (First Virginia) and 113th (First New Jersey) loaded aboard naval vessels at Norfolk. The 181st (Sixth Massachusetts), 166th (Fourth Ohio) and the 174th (Seventy-Fourth New York) staged through the New York Port of Embarkation.

The 140th (Sixth Missouri), 131st (First Illinois) and the 125th (Third Michigan) sailed through the Golden Gate. The 153d (First Arkansas) and 201st (West Virginia) originally staging at Camp Murray, Washington for shipment to Alaska, boarded transports in Seattle and sailed for the Philippines instead.

In addition, separate units of Antiaircraft, Tanks and Quartermaster were at sea. The 27th Bombardment Group (L) arrived November 20, 1941 but without their bombers and other Table of Organization equipment. Shortly after Pearl Harbor they would be formed into a Provisional Infantry Regiment and fight on foot.

The Separate infantry regiments were hastily assembled at the ports with their component units of artillery, engineer, medical and signal and organized as Regimental Combat Teams (RCT). Most RCT'S were from the same parent division and had recently maneuvered together as a team.

A staff school was conducted enroute where the various units could become better acquainted on the long boat rides. After a few days at sea their mission and destination was disclosed. For the units shipping from New Orleans and east coast ports, this information was not disclosed until they were safely through the Panama Canal.

The american luxury liner shipping firms cooperated and many of the fast passenger boats were pressed into service. A hodge-podge of american freighters were used to move the table of organization equipment plus two very important ships which loaded the new combat field rations at Philadelphia.

Some hint of the destination could be assumed by the men when they turned in their winter clothing and drew additional suntan (khaki) uniforms. Japanese intelligence was not able to make a clear estimate on this sudden activity at the ports as the troops still wore divisional patches of their parent organization and they were unable to fathom shipment of at least a dozen divisions, most of whom they knew to be still on maneuvers. Their greatest fear was that these units were reinforcing

the Hawaaian bases (The Japanese priority target). There was a thought to take aggressive action against these troopships in the Pacific but it was sooner than they had planned to attack and they reasoned that since they were mostly ground forces it would not interfere with their Pearl Harbor attack.


The US had broken the Japanese code but there was no need for them to worry about the american code as their agents read the daily newspapers to obtain maximum intelligence information. Even though they had complete intelligence information, the asian mind had never been able to understand the american ability to accomplish quick change of plans.

General Marshall had consulted quietly with key members of Congress, the shipping industry, labor and logistical corporations on the movement and no big news stories had been filed. Most of the units involved had belonged to divisions then on maneuvers and it was not unusual for a Regimental Combat Team to be separated from the parent division for a mission. The division information officers kept reporters interested in the other regiments of the division and allowed these separate RCT's to quietly withdraw.

General Grunert was reassigned to the mainland before most of the units arrived but General Macarthur and his new combined staff at USAFFE welcomed them at their destination points, briefed the commanders on their mission, and assigned them to the three tactical commands:

The Visayan-Mindanao Force, commanded by Brigadier General William F. Sharp, received the 113th RCT, 174th RCT and 153d RCT all assigned to Mindanao; the 125th RCT to Leyte-Samar. In addition General Sharp's command consisted of the elements of three Philippine Army (PA) divisions and one regiment of Philippine Scouts (PS).

The South Luzon Force, commanded by Major General George M. Parker, received the 138th RCT, the 140th RCT and the 176th RCT. General Parker's command also consisted of the 31st, 41st and 51st (PA) divisions.



The Northern Luzon Force, commanded by Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, received the 131st RCT, 144th RCT, 166th RCT, 182d RCT and the 201st RCT. General Wainwright's command also consisted of the Philippine Division (31st US Infantry, 45th and 57th (PS) Regiments), the 26th Cavalry (PS), 1st Regular Division, 11th, 21st, 71st and 91st (PA) Divisions. He was later assigned the Provisional Infantry Regiment formed by members of the 27th Bombardment (L).

Major General George F. Moore commanded the Manila and Subic Bay defenses, and was assigned the 4th Marine Regiment (Two battalions) when they arrived from China December 1, 1941. They were based at Corregidor.

Colonel James R.N. Weaver commanded the Provisional Tank Group, which was to become the workhorse of the Luzon Campaign. (108 Light Tanks and forty-six half-tracks)

Admiral Hart's Asiatic Fleet consisted of the following:

Patrol Wing 10, with 32 Consolidated PBY's.

3 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 29 submarines, and a number of gun boats, torpedo boats, and auxiliary craft.

Major General Lewis H. Brereton's Far East Air Force consisted of 74 Heavy and Medium bombers, 175 pursuit planes and 58 miscellaneous military aircraft in his V Bomber Command, V Interceptor Command, and Far East Service Command. His squadrons included 35 B-17's and 107 Curtiss P-40 E's, these models being the most modern in production in the US.

General MacArthur had an impressive lineup of combat troops to defend the Philippines, which the Japanese learned when they tried to land initially with two reinforced divisions in December. Japan would eventually commit ten divisions to the battle which cancelled plans to invade the Solomon Islands and New Guinea.

With adequate warning about Pearl Harbor, the armed forces were ready in the Philippines on December 8, 1941. General Brereton had intelligence reports of a beehive of activity at the Formosan ports and dispatched his B-17's for the first offensive blow. A low fog on Formosa grounded the Japanese bombers, but did not

affect the approach of the american B-17's as the fog lifted as they arrived. Their bombs caught the Japanese planes warming up on the taxi strips and even the near misses potholed the runways making it dangerous for the surviving Japanese flyers to take off. Several Zero's were able to get airborne and were able to shoot down several of the B-17's. This bomber was vulnerable in the tail section and the Zero pilots were quick to take advantage of this defect. (Upon landing the surviving B-17's were outfitted with a field expedient. The tail section was sawed off at the end and ground force 50 Caliber machines guns were welded into place. The gunner, lying prone, was cramped but was able to traverse properly and some astonished Zero pilots bit the dust on the next encounters when they pulled in behind the B-17's expecting an easy target. Instead they were targeted).

The raid on Formosa was so effective that it was another 24 hours before the Japanese bombers were able to arrive over the Philippines. Maximum effect by the antiaircraft guns kept damage to the minimum and the P-40's now had a chance to prove their fighting ability. Several Japanese bombers did not return to Formosa. To avoid possible damage to the valuable B-17's, General Brereton based half his force at Del Monte Field in Mindanao.

General Brereton's raid was a master stroke and done on his own initiative, though some on the USAFFE staff thought it too daring and risky, but the successful mission was a signal to the Japanese that the Philippines was not going to be an easy plum to pick.

In the coming week, General Homma at sea with his invasion force, would sweat out these "stinger bees" and with good cause. In addition to the plastering he took from the Far East Air Force and navy submarines, he would suddenly be confronted with a well organized and superior force of ground troops on his attempted landings on Luzon.

The Japanese aggressive moves in the Philippine area had been blunted and they were without the american expertise to change plans in the middle of a campaign. This initial american victory helped salve the wound suffered at Pearl Harbor.

We Can't All Be Heroes combines the formal history of the infantry regiments in World War II with the inside, first-person story of life in those regiments. It is told with a fine sense of humor by the author and some of his colleagues with felicitous results. The history of these regiments is informative and straight from the shoulder; the delightful reminiscences down to earth and quite witty. The dramatic contrast between the two provides the reader with a truly enjoyable picture of life in the army.

The book gives detailed information on the units stationed in various parts of the world and the circumstances by which the units were fated to serve as separate infantry regiments. The author then recalls his haphazard entrance into the service, and relates humorous events that can

easily result in tears of laughter years later while reminiscing, but tears of bitterness and frustration while actually experiencing them. The appendix is a collection of poetry written by the author during his army days. They are touching, witty, and display the pride with which the author was filled to perform his duty to his country.

Here is the untold story of World War II, the infantry regiments who served during that time, and their important yet unpublicized duty of safeguarding far-flung outposts with no new laurels to add to the regimental banners. *We Can't All Be Heroes* is a fine tribute to those men yearning to test their mettle in combat, but forced to sit out the war in remote places of the world, with disease and exhaustion their enemies.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Born on July 30, 1920, in Mingo (Denton County) Texas, the author entered military service with the Thirty-sixth Infantry Division (Texas National Guard) on February 9, 1939, serving throughout World War II with the 144th Infantry Regiment, the separate regiment from this division. He was discharged from the army on December 5, 1945, and he reenlisted in July, 1948, during the Berlin airlift.

He received a reserve commission in April, 1949, and was assigned to duty in Okinawa in January, 1950. He entered active duty as a lieutenant on September 9, 1950, serving with the Thirty-fifth (Cacti) Regiment of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division until October, 1951. He was awarded the silver star for gallantry in action and retired with the rank of major on September 1, 1963.

The author and his wife reside in Chesterfield, Virginia.

for autographed copy to:

Melvin C. Walthall

P.O. Box 89 Chesterfield, Va. 23832

.A.

Please send me copies of **WE CAN'T ALL BE HEROES** by Melvin Curtis at \$7.50 plus 50 cents for postage and handling per copy. I am enclosing my check \$.....*

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
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WE CAN'T ALL BE HEROES

*A History of the Separate Infantry
Regiments in World War II*

Melvin Curtis Walthall

HEADQUARTERS 35th DIVISION
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas



GENERAL ORDERS)
NO. 23)

15 April 1941

1. During the temporary absence of Colonel HARRIE S. MUELLER, O-102015, General Staff Corps, Chief of Staff, this Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel HOWARD S. SEARLE, O-123165, (FA), General Staff Corps, is announced as Acting Chief of Staff.

2. Captain WILDER E. SHEARD, O-301496, Adjutant General's Department, is announced as Assistant Adjutant General, 35th Division.

3. Major FRED B. HOUSE, O-252952, Adjutant General's Department, is announced as Division Morale Officer.

By command of Major General TRUMAN:

HOWARD S. SEARLE
Lt Colonel, (FA) GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

W. C. Elliott
W. C. ELLIOTT
Captain, A.G.D.
Acting Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "A"

INFORMATION FOR THE "DAILY INFORMATION SHEET" MUST BE IN THE OFFICE
OF THE DIVISION ADJUTANT PRIOR TO 8:00 AM, TO BE PUBLISHED THAT DAY

HEADQUARTERS, 35th DIVISION
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas

16 April 1941

DAILY INFORMATION SHEET
No. 91.



OFFICIAL:

1. AIR CORPS TRAINING FILM: There will be a showing of an Air
Corps Training Film at regimental recreation halls on the follow-
ing schedule:

April	(130th Field Artillery --- 7:00 PM
16 - Wed.	(
	(161st Field Artillery --- 8:30 PM
	(
17 - Thurs.	(138th Infantry --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(140th Infantry --- 8:30 PM
	(
18 - Friday	(110th Quartermaster --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(127th Field Artillery --- 8:30 PM
	(
21 - Monday	(110th Medical Regiment --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(110th Engineers ---- 8:30 PM
	(
22 - Tuesday	(153rd Infantry --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(Div. Sp. Trs. Bn.,
	(in 137th Rec. Hall --- 8:30 PM

Men eligible for this training should be encouraged to see this
film.

2. The uniform for officers, after retreat and for the evening
(formal) mess will continue to be the woolen coat with belt and
trousers or breeches, until April 30th. After that date, the uni-
form will be khaki shirts, khaki ties and trousers.

White uniforms will not be required, but all officers are
urged to get them. The white mess jacket will not be required,
nor suggested. However, if all the officers of a regiment desire
to purchase the white mess jacket, no objections will be made.

- Over -

3. There are entirely too many letters being received by the Commanding General direct from enlisted men of the Division. While everyone has the right to address the Commanding General, there are prescribed channels through which these communications should be sent. Company, battery and detachment commanders will take steps to acquaint the men of their command with the proper manner in which to communicate with the Commanding General.

4. Attention of all commanders is called to Item 9, DIS 43, 19 February, which lists the authorized absentees from drill.

5. Letter from the Camp Quartermaster is published for information of all concerned:

"While Army Regulations require that post, camp and station equipment, and other equipment not organizational equipment, will be issued on memorandum receipt directly to the using organization; i.e., company, battery, or individual, this office has received verbal instructions from the Commanding General, Seventh Corps Area, through the Quartermaster, Seventh Corps Area, that because of the obvious volume of such receipts and the limited personnel available to process such receipts, all memorandum receipt issues will be to regiments and similar units.

Regimental and similar unit supply officers should re-issue on memorandum receipt to the using organization or individual. Semi-annual consolidated memorandum receipts will be issued by this office per regiment or similar unit."

6. Physical inspection of personnel attending Division Radio and Message Center Schools will be held prior to 8:20 AM.

7. NOTICE: Only four (4) more days to secure National Service Life Insurance. (Except for selectees).

8. Priority on roads is given for the 60th Field Artillery Brigade for Thursday, 17 April 1941, between 7:30 AM and 9:00 AM; 11:30 and 12:00 AM; 12:30 and 1:30 PM; and 4:30 and 5:40 PM, on the following roads for movement to and from the Artillery Firing Points, before and after Service Practice: (Map - Road Map, Camp Robinson, 1/40,000 prepared by the 60th Field Artillery Brigade) Leaving and entering Camp at 28th and Missouri on Road (new road): CR 17 -- CR 131 -- RJ 122 -- RJ 82, and return.

9. All claims for quarters allowance will now be prepared for signature as follows:


"For the Commanding General:

S. G. FAIRCHILD
Lieut. Col., F.A.
Executive"

10. Parade at Retreat April 16, 1941 by the Third Battalion,
140th Infantry.

By Command of Major General TRUMAN:

OFFICIAL:


W. C. ELLIOTT
Captain, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

HOWARD S. SEARLE
Lt. Col., (FA), GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

INFORMATION:

1. Weather Report: Received Wednesday, 9:00 AM
Cloudy with occasional showers tonight and Thursday.
Not much change in temperature.

2. ARRIVALS:

Lt. Col. Edward J. Renth -----	Division Staff
Captain Russell Boyt -----	140th Infantry
2nd Lt. John Q. Holmes -----	35th M. P. Co.
W. O. Marvin J. Boston -----	134th Infantry
2nd Lt. James K. Terry -----	138th Infantry
2nd Lt. Grover J. Butler -----	153rd Infantry
1st Lt. Gladwell G. Emerson -----	138th Infantry

DEPARTURES:

Colonel Harrie S. Mueller -----	Wichita, Kansas
Captain T. Paul Hughes -----	Ft. Leavenworth, Ka.
2nd Lt. Grover J. Butler -----	Cottonplant, Ark.

3.

TODAY'S THEATER ATTRACTION

"HIRED WIFE"

With

Rosalind Russell and Brian Aherne

INFORMATION FOR THE "DAILY INFORMATION SHEET" MUST BE IN THE OFFICE
OF THE DIVISION ADJUTANT PRIOR TO 8:00 AM, TO BE PUBLISHED THAT DAY

HEADQUARTERS, 35th DIVISION
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas

18 April 1941

DAILY INFORMATION SHEET
No. 93.



OFFICIAL:

1. Members of the Seventh Day Adventists Church will be eligible for twenty-four hour passes from sunset Friday evening to sunset Saturday evening for the purpose of devoting this time to religious worship. Where they are so excused, they will be on duty the following Sunday.
2. Canvas and Tentage: Regimental S-4's will report to Division Quartermaster by Monday noon, 21 April 1941, all tentage in their organization. This report will include latrine screens, paulins and tent flies. A list of all shortage in tentage based on T/B/A will also be included.
3. a. There will be a meeting of the 35th Division Camp Exchange Committee of Non-commissioned Officers at 10:30 PM, Tuesday, April 22, 1941, at building #420 upstairs. Each regimental commander will select one non-commissioned officer to represent the regimental branch exchange at this meeting. Meeting will be conducted under the provisions of Par. 24b, AR 210-65. Master Sgt. Raymond C. Jones will preside at this meeting.

b. Attention of all commanders is called to Par. 39, AR 210-65. Use of Coupon Books. Coupon books will show the organization to whom the enlisted man belongs and bear the name of the enlisted man to whom issued, and will be honored at the 35th Division Camp Exchanges only when presented by the enlisted man whose name appears on the book. Loose coupons will not be accepted when detached from the book. Organization Commanders should inform all enlisted men of this regulation.
4. State Adjutants General are experiencing some difficulty in obtaining complete information from unit commanders when the report of discharge of a member of the Inducted National Guard is made to the unit's respective State. In these reports, the Division Special Order authorizing the discharge will be cited by number, paragraph, and date. In this connection attention is again invited to paragraph 5, DIS No. 66, 18 March 1941.

5. NOTICE: Only two (2) more days to purchase National Service Life Insurance. (Except for Selectees)


6. Parade at Retroat, 18 April 1941 by the Third Battalion, 137th Infantry.

7. FLYING CADETS: Due to the fact that the Flying Cadet Board will be at Camp Robinson for only one (1) day, Thursday, 24 April only those who have actually completed at least the required two years of college or university will be actually examined. However, the board will disseminate information regarding the pilot training, to those desiring it. Written examinations in lieu of two years of college will not be given here.

8. AIR CORPS (NON-FLYING - GROUND): Information regarding Army Air Corps (ground-non flying) has been placed in the boxes of all organizations of the Division. This information contains a "John Doe" letter and 1st Indorsement, copy of Recruiting Bulletin No. 13, and example of training offered. The soldier-applicant will initiate the request for discharge for the purpose of re-enlistment and this will be sent thru channels for approval. When approved, the soldier will present himself, with his papers at the Camp Recruiting Office by 8:00 AM, Monday to Friday for physical examination. When the soldier passes the necessary physical examination, he will be returned to his organization for discharge. The Regular Army will "pick" him up effective the day after the date of discharge as per Army Regulations. Final statement will be paid by the Finance Officer after evidence of re-enlistment is presented.

By Command of Major General TRUMAN:

OFFICIAL:


W. C. ELLIOTT
Captain, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

HOWARD S. SEARLE
Lt. Col., (FA), GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

INFORMATION:

1. Regular Army Vacancies:
80 vacancies ----- 1st Infantry, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

2. TODAY'S THEATER ATTRACTION-----TENT THEATER & LLOYD ENGLAND HALL

"DANCING ON A DIME"

With

Grace McDonald and Robert Paige

3. Weather Report: Received Friday, 9:05 AM
Scattered showers tonight and Saturday

HEADQUARTERS 35th DIVISION
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas

18 April 1941

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO. 24)

1. The following Staff Assignments, 35th Division, are announced:

ASSISTANT TO ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

Major DONALD M. ASHLOCK, FA, O-219043.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

2nd Lieutenant WILLIAM O. MAINS, Inf, O-406951.

By command of Major General TRUMAN:

HOWARD S. SEARLE
Lt Colonel, (FA) GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:



W. C. ELLIOTT
Captain, A.G.D.
Acting Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "A"

INFORMATION FOR THE "DAILY INFORMATION SHEET" MUST BE IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIVISION ADJUTANT PRIOR TO 8:00 AM, TO BE PUBLISHED THAT DAY

HEADQUARTERS, 35th DIVISION
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas

19 April 1941

DAILY INFORMATION SHEET

No. 94.

OFFICIAL:

1. Prints are being prepared by 110th Engineers for model tent arrangement which will be made standard throughout the 35th Division and attached units.
2. Commanders of all eschelons will be held responsible for failure of enlisted men to report at time and place designated for Division Schools.
3. FLYING CADETS: It has been reported that some company and battery commanders are discouraging the men of their organizations from applying for Army Flying Cadet Training. Regimental and separate unit commanders will take the necessary steps to insure that all men eligible who desire to do so can apply for this training.
4. Artillery Firing (37 mm, sub caliber) will be in progress Tuesday and Wednesday, April 22-23, 1941, 7:30 AM to 4:45 PM in Training areas D and E. Military personnel desiring to visit the Firing Points will find all roads blocked from CATC, US 65, or other points except the SATILLIC Road over Clifton Mountain via Deadman's Hill to CR8, where they will be met and guided to Firing Points.
5. Priority on roads is given for the 60th Field Artillery Brigade for Tuesday and Wednesday, April 22-23, 1941, between 7:30 AM and 9:00 AM; 11:30 and 12:00 AM; 12:30 and 1:30 PM; and 4:30 and 5:40 PM, on the following roads for movement to and from the Artillery Firing Points, before and after Service Practice: (Map--Road Map, Camp Robinson, 1/40,000 prepared by the 60th Field Artillery Brigade) leaving and entering Camp at 28th and Missouri on Engineer Road (new road) CR 17 -- CR 131 -- RJ 122 -- RJ 82 -- CR 8.
6. Parade at Retreat, 20 April 1941, by the entire regiment -- 110th Engineers.

- Over -


7. Only one (1) more day to purchase National Service Life Insurance.

8. Paragraph 1, DIS No. 91 is changed to read:

21 - Monday	(110th Medical Regt. --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(110th Engineers --- 8:30 PM
22 - Tuesday	(153rd Infantry --- 7:00 PM
	(
	(Div. Sp. Trs. Bn.,
	(in 137th Rec. Hall --- 8:30 PM

By Command of Major General TRUMAN:

OFFICIAL:


W. C. ELLIOTT
Captain, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

HOWARD S. SEARLE
Lt. Col., (FA), GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

INFORMATION:

1. LOST: Officers garrison cap. New, size 7 $\frac{1}{4}$, Memphis clothier mark, back strap with hook. Cap was lost 17 April 1941 between 6:15 PM and 7:00 PM in Division Officers' Mess. If found please return to Lt. Col. Ross Diehl, G-2, who will forward the cap to Lt. Col Robert B. McBride, G-2, Second Army.

2. Religious services for officers of the 35th Division Staff; officers and men of the Special Troops; officers and men of the 69th Infantry Brigade Hq Co, will be conducted at the 137th Infantry Recreation Hall, Sunday, 20 April 1941, at 8:30 AM. March from Division Area will begin at 8:15 AM.

3. TODAY'S THEATER ATTRACTION---THEATRE AT THE LLOYD ENGLAND HALL

PIERCE

With

Lloyd Nolan and Nancy Barrett

"MEET THE WILDCATS"

With

Ralph Bellamy and Margaret Lindsey

SUNDAY ----- "KITTY FOYLE" with Ginger Rogers

HISTORY
OF
COMPANY "D" 153RD INFANTRY
FROM
AUGUST 1940 TO APRIL 1944

ANNEX ----- "D"

AUGUST 1941

After return from leaves and furloughs, Colonel McAlister (now released from active duty) read commendations from Lieutenant General Lear (then commander of 2nd Army) as a result of the excellent performance of the regiment in the Tennessee maneuvers. Regimental S-3 then prepared a rigorous and exacting advanced training program, the final testing of our regiment, which had already won a superior rating in the recent maneuvers. But, because of our achievement, the regiment was unable to complete the projected training program before being ordered to Alaska to take part in the Defense of the Territory--a real assignment for such a young regiment.

The first and second platoons (MG, Cal. 30 Hvy) were attached to Companies A and C respectively to perform the usual Heavy Weapons task of close and continuous support of the 1st Battalion Rifle Companies.

2nd Lt. Vannoy (now Captain, commanding Co A, 153d Infantry) and 44 Enlisted Men of Company D were attached to Co A and were ultimately sent to Nome, Alaska, for defense of the air strip and dock facilities there.

1st Lt. Robinson (now Captain) and 44 Enlisted Men were attached to Company C to defend Annette Island Landing Field just off the coast near Ketchikan, Alaska.

The first and second platoons left Company D on 1 August 1941.

Company Headquarters and the third and fourth platoons (consisted of 2 Officers and 71 Enlisted Men) remained in Camp Robinson until 16 August 41, at which time they were moved by rail to Camp Murray, Wash., arriving at Camp Murray on 20 August 41.

From 20 August 41 to 7 December 41 the Company Headquarters and third and fourth platoons were training for our positions of the task in the defense of Alaska, (under the Command of Captain Kelley until 27 October 41 when Captain (now Major, executive officer third Battalion 153d Infantry) James C. Williams assumed Command).

On the Historical day of 7 December 1941 when the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese took place, the third and fourth platoons of Company D were alerted and placed in Fort Lewis, Washington, for the purpose of defending IX Corps Headquarters and vicinity against low flying aircraft and mechanized attack which was believed to be so imminent at the time.

On 21 December Company D (less first and second platoons) was ordered to McChord Field, Washington, to form base security and perimeter defense of that airfield with machine guns of calibre 30, 50 and Calibre rifles that could be mustered.

On 6 January 42 Company D (less two platoons) left McChord Field to return to Camp Murray, Washington, and prepare for shipment to Alaska, exact destination unknown.

On 25 February 1942 Company D (less two platoons) embarked on the US St. Mihiel with four officers and 116 enlisted men (secret Ltr Hq WDC and fourth Army 370.5 (G-3) dtd January 4, 1942) for destination John B.

On March 2, 1942 at 1500 USAT St Mihiel docked at Seward, Alaska, Officers and men in good condition. Company D (less two platoons) was attached to third Battalion at Ft. Raymond for Duty, Rations, and Administration.

From 2 March 42 to 3 June Company D (under the command of Captain Williams until 10 April at which time 1st Lt. Damp (Now Captain (S-3, 3rd Bn) assumed command) prepared positions along the beach and at points in the bay (Resurrection) area for Calibre 50 machine guns and 81 mm Mortars).

On 3 June (the day of the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor) Company D was alerted and manned prepared positions twenty-four hours a day on 100% alert until 10 June. From 10 June the unit manned only the positions in the dock and airstrip areas.

From 10 June 42 to January 43 Company D spent the most of her time in stevedoring on the Seward Docks moving equipment via of the Alaska Railroad to Anchorage, Alaska and further consolidations of defensive positions in the Seward area.

The unit assisted in unloading and reloading on freight cars of the railroad an average of one and one half (estimate) ships of approximately 7000 - 10,000 tons per week for a period of eighteen months. The equipment handled varied from medical supplies to combat vehicles, tanks, heavy artillery howitzers, rifles, and allied implements.

During early 1943 Company D was training for the projected attack on Attu and Kiska, with all measures learned by our fighting forces in the Southwest Pacific. The unit was training in cold climate fighting, bivouacing in weather that before the Russian campaign was thought impossible to live in-much-less fight in. Company D trained in skiing, mountainering, camouflage with regard to weather and terrain to be encountered on Kiska and Attu.

But it fell Company D's lot never to have the opportunity to display pressure on either of the two islands.

In January 1943 the War Department authorized a new Table of Organization and Equipment for Infantry Regiments which reduced our strength in Company D from four officers and 117 men to 3 Officers and 90 men, thereby doing away with the Calibre 50 machine gun platoon and increasing the 81 mm mortar platoon to three sections. To comply with this change in the Table of Organization 22 men were transferred to Headquarters Company 3d Bn, so as to conform to strength set up.

From Spring to October Company D trained in all phases of training that the Army in the States was being trained in except those phases limited by the terrain in and around Fort Raymond.

In the month of October the 3d Bn instituted a Non-Commissioned Officers School that was designed to refresh and teach new points that had been learned in various campaigns throughout the global war. The school was successful enough to run for five three-week terms and one four-week term, under Lt. Hilman of Headquarters Company 3d Bn (personnel adj) and Lt. Boblett of Company D. The NCOs of Company attribute most of their advanced training to instructions gained in these schools.

On 18 December 1943, Captain Joseph A. Shoemaker of Company joined and assumed command of Company D.

From December 43 to March 44 Company D prepared for the movement from Seward (Fort Raymond) to the United States by Ship.

On 17 March 44 Company D, under the command of Captain Shoemaker boarded the USAT Gorgas at the Army Dock at Seward, Alaska with 2 officers and enlisted men.

On 17 March 44 Company D, under the command of Captain Shoemaker boarded the US St. Gorgas at the Army Dock at Seward, Alaska, with 2 Officers and 86 Enlisted Men.

On 23 March 44 the US St Gorgas docked at Seattle, Washington, with all Officers and men of Company in excellent physical condition and effervescent morale.

Company D entrucked at the dock of Seattle for FLSA Ft. Lawton, Washington. After a week's stay in Ft. Lawton getting physicals, reissue of clothing, and turn in some Alaskan clothing, we entrained at Seattle, Washington, for Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where we were reassigned to the 1st Bn and were rejoined by the 1st and 2nd machine gun platoons bringing our company strength to 5 Officers and 145 enlisted men.